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Ballot initiatives that add provisions to state constitutions
are rapidly coming to dominate state government in California,
Colorado, and Oregon, and other states will soon join the list.
The initiative device has become a major outlet for citizens
dissatisfied with their governments, and its use is likely to
increase, both in frequency and geography. There is significant
support for amending the United States Constitution to
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authorize a national initiative.' Given this trend, the structure
and procedures for initiatives have ever greater consequences.
Public discussion of the initiative process focuses almost
exclusively on the content of controversial measures.2 If one
favors term limits for elected officials, tax limits, or limitations
on gay rights, then initiatives are a meaningful instrument of
democracy. If one does not support most of the successful
measures, then initiatives are tyranny of the majority and a
threat to the republican form of government. The error is the
assumption that all initiative processes are indistinguishable.
The discussion overlooks the importance of the details of
initiative procedures. Some initiative processes work substan-
tially better than others.3 The adequacy (or inadequacy) of
procedure is central to the debate over whether initiatives are
useful or harmful.
This article explores the principal procedural differences
among forms of state-wide initiatives, both generally and with
particular attention to Colorado. It assesses the goals of
initiators and reviews the most frequent criticisms of the device.
The article then analyzes the structure of Colorado's initiative
laws in detail, both in the state constitution and statutes. The
concluding section recommends ways to structure the initiative
to avoid its practical shortcomings and better realize its
potential for genuine reform.
I. INITIATIVES AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Initiatives are among several forms of "direct democracy" in
common use in American states. The initiative empowers
citizens, by petition, to require a popular vote on whether to
adopt a statute or constitutional amendment they have drawn
up.4 Twenty-four states authorize state-wide initiatives, and
1. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE
L.J. 1503 (1990); Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican
Government," 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989).
3. For commentary on initiative procedures see Nick Brestoff, Comment, The
California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922
(1975).
4. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSI-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 35-36 (1984). Some writers, especially outside the
United States, define the initiative as a particular kind of referendum, using the
latter term to mean any popular vote to adopt or reject a law. Others limit
referendums to popular votes on measures originating in legislatures, in contrast
1995]
50 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
many local governments have them, including some in states
lacking state-wide initiatives.' Our concern in this article is
with state-wide initiatives. We refer to other forms of direct
democracy only incidentally.
6
Initiatives can be direct or indirect. The indirect initiative
requires that citizens first petition the legislature. Only if
rebuffed may they force a popular vote, although at that point
the citizens' proposal has the same right to popular enactment
as under the direct initiative.' Thus the terms are unfortu-
nate, suggesting that the indirect version is an inferior form of
"direct democracy." More accurate terms would be immediate
and delayed initiative. But the direct/indirect locution is in
wide use, so we adhere to it in this paper. So defined, the most
important example of the indirect initiative is the Swiss
national initiative.' Most initiative states in the United States
allow only direct initiatives to compel popular votes without any
to initiatives. In any case, there is general agreement that initiatives are laws
drafted by citizens and enacted by popular vote. Compare KRIS W. KOBACH, THE
REFERENDUM: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 12 n.10 (1993) (initiative a
kind of referendum) with MAGLEBY, supra, at 1, 35-36 (initiative and referendum
distinguished). We use referendums as the plural rather than referenda on advice
of the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 466 (2d ed. 1989).
5. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INI-
TIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 51 (1989) (listing Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-17-1 to -61 (Supp. 1994); MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 38-39;
Austin Ranney, The United States of America, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 71-75 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds.,
1978).
6. See generally CRONIN, supra note 5, at 38-59. The other form of direct
democracy most relevant to the issues discussed in this article is the device that
allows citizens, by petition, to force a popular vote whether to rescind or block a
statute newly enacted by the legislature. Everyone calls this device a referendum,
but modifiers to distinguish it from other referendums, such as those put on the
ballot by the legislature, vary chaotically. See, e.g., KOBACH, supra note 4, at 15
("optional legislative referendum"); MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 36 ("popular
referendum"); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: THE
PEOPLE'S LAW 13 (1987) ("legislative referendum"); CRONIN, supra note 5, at 2
("popular referendum" or "petition referendum"); Ranney, supra note 5, at 70
("statutory referendum"). In this article, we have chosen the term "rescinding
referendum" to identify its function in rescinding a legislative enactment. Ken-
tucky, Maryland, and New Mexico allow rescinding referendums but not initia-
tives.. All but one of the initiative states (Florida) also allow rescinding
referendums. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 38-39.
7. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 35-36.
8. KOBACH, supra note 4, at 15.
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involvement of the legislature. The indirect initiative is
important in the five states that allow it but do not have the
direct initiative, notably Massachusetts.9
Most initiative states, including Colorado, allow initiatives
either to enact statutes or to amend their constitutions. 10
However, the distinction between statutory and constitutional
initiatives is blurred because many states that allow statutory
initiatives restrict the power of their legislatures to amend or
repeal initiated statutes." In California, an initiated statute
can be changed only by another popular Vote.' 2 Under the
California rule, the statutory initiative is nearly as entrenched
as the constitutional. The principal difference is that the
statutory initiative is subject to judicial review under the state
constitution, while the constitutional initiative overrides
inconsistent provisions of the state constitution. 3
! In most states that allow it, the constitutional initiative is
easy enough to qualify for the ballot that it is frequently used.
Our received concept of the U.S. Constitution is fundamental
law that is seldom changed and only with substantial consen-
9. CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIvE 359-60
(1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA COMM'N] (Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Wyoming allow only the indirect initiative. Utah and Washington allow both.
Michigan, Nevada, and Ohio allow only direct for constitutional amendments and
only indirect for statutes); MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273 (providing for indirect
initiative only). Colorado's provision for local-government initiatives authorizes
only the indirect initiative, while its state-wide initiative is only the direct form.
See infra note 76.
10. Six states (Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming)
allow initiatives only to enact statutes, and three (Florida, Illinois and Mississippi)
allow them only to amend their constitutions. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 38-39;
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 23-17-1 to -61 (Supp. 1994).
11. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 366-67 (half the states allowing
initiated statutes impose some restrictions on legislative repeal; four impose severe
restrictions).
12. Id. at 366 (unless the initiated measure itself authorizes legislative
amendment). Arizona imposes the same limit when an initiative is approved by
a majority of registered voters. Id. at 367. Colorado allows amendment or repeal
of initiated state statutes by the normal legislative process, but requires that
changes in laws initiated in local governments be made only by another initiative.
See infra note 76.
13. E.g., Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d
337,341-42 (Fla. 1978). But see MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(5)(a), (d) (constitution-
al initiative cannot be used to amend state's bill of rights or initiative provision).
All state and local initiatives are, of course, subject to review under the U.S.
Constitution.
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sus. By that standard, many state constitutional initiatives
look more like ordinary legislation than fundamental law. 4
When initiators have a choice between enacting a statute
or amending the state constitution, they incline strongly toward
entrenching their handiwork in the constitution. For example,
Colorado's initiators proposed fifty-five amendments and thirty-
eight statutes between 1912 and 1958.15 This is not surprising
because initiators tend to be very strong advocates of their pro-
posals. Moderate views usually do not generate the incentive
to conduct an initiative campaign.
In recent years, dominance of the constitutional form has
increased in the states that allow it.16 For example, in Colora-
do twenty-six of the thirty measures on the ballot since 1984
have sought to amend the state constitution. 7 The constitu-
tional initiative is the dominant form of state-wide initiative
today, and it presents the most controversial issues about the
initiative and its uses.
The state-wide, constitutional initiative works a significant
change in the traditional American concept of governmental
structure. Differences between constitution and legislation are
much reduced. The notion of a constitution as fundamental law
that is seldom changed, and only with substantial consensus, is
gone. Constitutions are amended often and by voting majorities
that are typically a minority of a state's adult population."
14. See Ranney, supra note 5, at 76. Switzerland's national initiative allows
amendments to the constitution but does not allow adoption of ordinary
legislation. Hence, the subjects of many Swiss initiatives seem more statutory
than constitutional in character. See Charles B. Blankart, A Public-Choice View
of Swiss Liberty, 23 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM, Spring 1993, at 88.
15. See Paul D. Starr, The Initiative and Referendum in Colorado 37 (1958)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Colorado).
16. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 359.
17. See infra note 77; see also CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 174-82.
18. For example, two prominent amendments that passed in Colorado in
1992 each received about 32.5% of the voting age population, or about 40.6% of
registered voters. See Submission of Interrogatories on Senate Bill 93-74,852 P.2d
1, 4 (Colo. 1993) (812,308 votes for 1992 Amendment One, limiting taxing and
spending); Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (813,966 votes for
1992 Amendment Two, restricting gay rights); THE ELECTION DATA BOOK: A
STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF VOTING IN AMERICA 1992, at 132 (Kimball W. Brace ed.,
1992) (voting age population of Colorado in 1992 estimated at 2,501,000, with
2,003,375 registered voters). California's best known ballot measure, tax-cutting
Proposition 13, was adopted at a primary election by about 26.9% of the voting age
population, or 43.9% of registered voters in 1978. Votes for the measure are
computed from MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 88 (44% of voting age turnout);
CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 186 (96.5% of turnout voted on Proposition
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The role of the state's judiciary is reduced, and the executive
veto is bypassed.
This is not necessarily bad. Many democracies in the world
function well without our concepts of a fundamental constitu-
tion and separation of powers. In traditional parliamentary
governments, such as Britain's, constitutional change can be
enacted by majority vote of Parliament. 9 In Switzerland, the
constitutional initiative is used frequently.2 ° However, those
governments have traditional sources of stability that ours lack.
State constitutions filled with provisions that look like
ordinary legislation, and easily amended by a small percentage
of the voters, diverge greatly from what most Americans think
a constitution is. By our traditions, a constitution establishes
the structure for government to act subject to basic and general
prohibitions in a bill of rights. It is supported by consensus and
should seldom need amending. Constitutional language is
broad and general, destined to endure.
II HISTORY OF INITIATIVES
Americans of the generation that framed the Constitution
were familiar with accounts of Athenian and other ancient
examples of direct democracy, and the New England town
meeting was established well before independence. 2' But
many of the Framers expressed hostility to direct democracy,
and during the founding period, constitutional and ratifying
conventions were the broadest form of citizen participation in
general use22
13); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION
132 (1989) (64.8% yes votes). California had 10,129,986 registered voters. THE
ELECTION DATA BOOK, supra, at 108. These are the most prominent ballot
measures; votes on others are lower. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 77-99.
19. See generally A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 39-85 (10th ed. 1959) (discussing the nature of parliamentary
sovereignty).
20. See KOBACH, supra note 4, at 70-78.
21. CHARLES S. LOBINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAw 99-102 (1909). See generally
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 69-79 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945) (discussing New England townships).
22. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 12-20, 22, 41; see also MAGLEBY, supra note 4,
at 31. See generally LOBINGIER, supra note 21, at 137-87 (discussing constitutional
origin and development during Revolutionary Era); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 55,
63 (James Madison).
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Referendums were prominent in Europe during the French
Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath." They gradually
took hold in this country as the means to ratify state constitu-
tions and amendments.24 But these were measures referred
to the voters by legislatures or constitutional conventions. The
concept of the initiative was a Swiss innovation, copied here
during the Progressive Era. Several Swiss cantons adopted the
constitutional initiative during the 1830s, and the legislative
initiative during the 1860s.25 In 1891, Switzerland added the
constitutional initiative for amending its national constitution.
American interest in broader forms of direct democracy grew
during the 1880s and 1890s, propelled by Swiss practice.26
Americans who had visited that nation led the movement to
promote the initiative and referendum in this country.
Most states that allow the initiative adopted it during the
Progressive Era.2 ' Beginning with South Dakota, nineteen
states authorized state-wide initiatives between 1898 and 1918.
The next state to do so was Alaska in its statehood constitution
in 1959, and four states have adopted it since. Several states
have rejected the initiative at various times. However, the
initiative is very popular, and it is far more likely that more
states will adopt it than any will repeal it. There is also a
movement to establish a national right to initiative. It does not
seem close to success, although opinion polls back the con-
cept.28  Other movements seek to promote various forms of
23. See generally MARKKU SUKSI, BRINGING IN THE PEOPLE 41-47 (1993)
(discussing French Revolution's influence on national decision-making).
24. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 41. See generally LOBINGIER, supra note
21, at 188-291 (overview of the extension of "popular ratification" throughout the
United States).
25. See generally KOBACH, supra note 4, at 18-30 (examining development
of the initiative in Switzerland). Some Swiss cantons and towns had the town-
meeting form of direct democracy long before the nineteenth century. Id. at 16-18.
26. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 35-36. See generally CRONIN,
supra note 5, at 43-54 (overview of populist movement and state adoptions of
initiative and referendum). Lobingier claims that a colonial Rhode Island law and
another in Georgia's first constitution were the first American initiatives.
LOBINGIER, supra note 21, at 358. However, the Rhode Island practice seems more
like a town meeting and Georgia's a form of convention.
27. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 51; see also id. at 3-4 (discussing states
that have rejected the initiative).
28. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 7, 12-14; see also CRONIN, supra note 5, at 4-
5. See generally id. at 157-95 (examining the desirability of a national initiative
and referendum).
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electronic voting that might make initiatives and referendums
cheaper to conduct.29
Colorado adopted the initiative in 1910.30 The right was
added to the state's constitution by a measure proposed by the
legislature in a year when Democrats controlled both houses.3
The governor, John Shafroth, was of Swiss descent and sought
to promote the concept as a bastion of Swiss liberty. As an
amendment to the constitution, the proposal required approval
in a popular referendum. It had the backing of most major
newspapers and swept the state, receiving over seventy-five
percent of the votes cast on the measure.32
III. ASSESSING THE AIMS OF DIRECT DEMOCRATS
Proponents often claim that the initiative is a more demo-
cratic way of governing than representative elections, that it is
a way of perfecting democracy. We sometimes say that
representative democracy is indirect democracy, while initia-
tives are a form of direct democracy. It is natural to assume
that direct is better, more nearly perfect, than indirect-that
the ideal of consent of the governed is better achieved by
consenting to the laws themselves, rather than to representa-
tive lawmakers. This argument from the logic of democracy
surely has much to do with the initiative's popularity.
33
When discussion turns from the abstract to messy reality,
proponents' claims become more particular, and some range
beyond the appeal to democracy into the realm of governmental
efficiency. We have chosen to group concrete claims into four
categories: empowerment of ordinary citizens; "good govern-
ment" aims such as increased participation, involvement, and
public discussion; majority rule as an ideal; and countering
governmental inefficiency.
29. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 220-22.
30. SCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 225-26. For an overview of Colorado's
adoption of the initiative, see generally CRONIN, supra note 5, at 52; Starr, supra
note 15, at 9-20.
31. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 52.
32. Id.
33. William Jennings Bryan lent his oratorical gifts to this proposition
during the Progressive Era. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 165-68. See also
MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 21; WALKER, supra note 6, at 50-52; Starr, supra note
15, at 11:
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A. Empowerment
Money was central to Progressive Era debates about the
initiative. The most common claim was that the initiative was
a way around monied influence on elected representatives.34
Corruption, especially of The Machine, had pride of place in
every debate. The initiative would empower citizens to override
legislatures held in thrall of wealthy patrons; it would "thrust
from power the Captains of Greed."35 Direct democracy would
allow citizens to enact measures to curb legal privileges of
wealth. Populists saw the initiative as a means to enact re-
distributive measures.36
As originally envisioned, these aims have been very little
realized. While states have enacted some redistributive
measures, virtually all have been the work of legislatures. 7
Some anti-corruption campaigns have succeeded, but the
initiative was not a prominent weapon in them.38 Moreover,
it is generally agreed that money is at least as important in
initiative campaigns as in elections. In California, money is
now essential simply to get enough signatures to force a vote.39
On the other hand, the initiative tends to benefit social
groups that are different from those served by representative
democracy on an important class of issues. These arise where
self-interest of the governing class is challenged. Such chal-
lenges usually relate to the efficiency of government, so we
discuss them under that heading below. But they have a dis-
tant kinship with the original, populist aims of initiative pro-
ponents.
B. Good Government
In addition to the general appeal to the logic of democracy,
proponents of the initiative tout good government aims of
promoting greater citizen involvement and participation in
government, of increasing and broadening public discussion of
34. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 53-57.
35. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 33.
36. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 54-57, 200-01. For general discussions of
reformers' distrust of the political machine, see RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE
OF REFORM 257-67 (1955); MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 21-25.
37. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 36, at 242-43, 268.
38. See generally id. at 257-71.
39. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 196, 202; MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 64, 76.
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issues, and of reforming the procedures of representative
government. Polls show a sizeable number of citizens who say
that being able to vote directly makes them more likely to vote
at all.4 °
Good government aims have been realized to some extent.
Initiative campaigns do involve large numbers of people, many
of whom are not involved in ordinary politics. Campaigns over
controversial subjects attract media attention, probably more
than the same issues before a legislature.4' And some initia-
tives, particularly in Colorado, have improved government
procedures in ways that representatives would not have
done.42
However, circulating petitions has become a business in
California, belying any image of amateur lawmaking.43 If this
tendency spreads to smaller states, participation will diminish.
Moreover, the total vote cast on initiative measures is usually
somewhat lower than for representatives. That is, some who
vote for representatives skip initiatives. Thus the promise of
inspiring more citizens to vote may not work out in practice,
with the exception of a few, very controversial issues." The
falloff in votes cast on initiatives from those cast for repre-
sentatives tends to increase with the length of the ballot, so one
irony is that the more the initiative is used, the less effectively
it involves more voters.4
Another good government claim is that availability of the
initiative keeps representatives in line, that fear of the ini-
tiative induces better representation. However, there is little
40. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 4, 11, 198, 202; MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at
2, 21-25, 28, 181-84; WALKER, supra note 6, at 52-54.
41. See SCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 26-29; CRONIN, supra note 5, at 198, 202.
42. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 20, 22a, 22b (1988 amendment
requiring legislative committee votes on bill's merits and barring binding party
caucus); id. art. V, §§ 46-48 (1974 amendment providing for legislative redistrict-
ing by reapportionment commission); id. art. VI, §§ 20, 23-26 (1966 amendment
providing for merit selection of judges); Act effective Jan. 14, 1985, 1985 Colo.
Sess. Laws 1793 (initiated statute to liberalize voting registration).
43. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 9, 12-13. For an examination of
how the practice of gathering signatures has lived up to its original purpose, see
generally id. at 125-55.
44. On average the falloff is not large. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 67-68, 209-
10. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 77-121 (analyzing who votes on ballot
propositions).
45. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 90-95 ("voter fatigue"). But see CRONIN,
supra note 5, at 68-70 (phenomenon of ballot fatigue is exaggerated).
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evidence that this is achieved by the direct initiative. It may
result from the indirect initiative, where the first phase elicits
consideration by the legislature. Studies in Switzerland, where
direct democracy rights are most extensive and most often used,
suggest that the legislature is more influenced by the threat of
a referendum to rescind enacted statutes than by the initiative.
This is because those who lose a vote in the legislature often be-
gin the adoption of a rescinding referendum.46
C. Majority Rule
An important variant of the concept that the initiative is a
perfection of democracy is the claim that the initiative allows
expression of pure majoritarian will, and that this is a vir-
tue.4" The premise is true relative to laws passed by legis-
latures. Representative government in America is designed to
avoid pure majority rule, for purposes of protecting minorities,
promoting compromises, and insuring deliberation of issues.
The initiative is a way around these barriers for at least some
majorities.
The initiative hardly enacts all majority preferences. To
the extent that money is necessary for a successful initiative
campaign, the initiative is not available to unorganized inter-
ests lacking financial backing. And those who actually vote on
initiatives tend to be better educated and more affluent than
those who vote for representatives or who do not vote at all.48
Some issues are passed based on genuine voter confusion.49
Nevertheless, initiatives surely enact majority will more effec-
tively than do legislatures.
Whether direct majority rule is a virtue is fiercely con-
tested. It clearly was not for Madison and other framers; who
spoke against it and deliberately designed the Constitution to
avoid it. 0 But majority rule at some level remains the funda-
mental principle of democracy, as Madison often acknowl-
46. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 10, 53; Blankart, supra note 14, at 90-91.
47. CRONIN, supra note 5, at 9. See also Dennis W. Arrow, Representative
Government and Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum
Regarding State Constitutional Amendment by Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 3 (1992).
48. MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 103-09, 183; see also CRONIN, supra note 5,
at 67.
49. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 87-89.
50. See text accompanying note 22; see also CRONIN, supra note 5, at 17-19.
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edged.5 Its opposite, minority rule, is plainly undemocratic.
The question is how ultimate majority rule should be tempered
to protect minority interests and ensure deliberation.
Every successful initiative defines the minority who voted
against it, as does every successful enactment by a legislature.
Concern for all such minorities would put into question any ma-
joritarian act and thus be contrary to democracy. Rather, con-
cern for minority interests arises in those cases when a majority
targets, distinct groups that are unpopular generally, groups
that are consistent losers in the majoritarian process or are the
subject of disabilities that are hard to explain in terms other
than dislike. America's classic example was the Jim Crow
system. Three examples adopted by initiative are Colorado's
amendment barring legal protection for gays, California's law
disabling Japanese farmers from owning land, and Oregon's law
requiring Catholic children to attend public schools.52
Compare the initiative with the complex relationship be-
tween legislatures and minority interests. Recall the many
times one has thought a legislature too responsive to a distinct
electoral ("special") interest, such as farmers, or oil companies,
or veterans, or environmentalists, or defense contractors, or a
civil rights group. We can all think of legislation enacted or
blocked because of intense support of a well-organized group
whose preference would probably not be approved by a referen-
dum of the whole electorate.
There are two reasons why organized interests can,
influence legislatures in this way. The more familiar is the
corruption of financial support. When the initiative overcomes
that, it is performing as its idealistic backers intend. The other
reason, less often acknowledged in common discourse, is that
legislatures reflect not only the number of a measure's propo-
nents, but also the intensity of their preferences. In this way,
minority interests are able to get their most strongly desired
legislation passed, even when that legislation would not achieve
majority support in a referendum. More important still, minori-
ties can persuade legislatures to amend the parts of majoritar-
51. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 49 (James Madison).
52. Each of the three initiatives was subsequently subject to judicial review.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down Oregon
initiative); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (sustaining California
initiative); Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (striking down Colorado
initiative). See generally CRONIN, supra note 5, at 90-98, 212-14 (minority rights).
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ian bills they find most objectionable, even if a referendum
would give majority backing to those parts.53
That legislatures are able to reflect intensity of preferences
as well as their popularity may make legislatures less efficient,
a point taken up below. But it is also an important feature of
mature democracy. Madison's solution to tyranny of the
majority was layered representative government, in which no
minority should consistently lose out.54 Legislatures have
failed to achieve his aim in some circumstances, such as the
long reign of Jim Crow. But initiatives can much more readily
isolate minorities, as recent anti-gay measures show.
Initiatives that target unpopular minorities are not a large
percentage of citizens' initiatives,5 but they are some of the
best known. Many of these have been overturned by the courts
on constitutional grounds, and proponents of the initiative
sometimes argue that judicial review is sufficient protection."
But there are several reasons for concern about relying solely
on judicial review. First, the constitutional initiative neutral-
izes judicial review under the state's constitution, which would
otherwise preserve more legal diversity, thereby nationalizing
more issues. Second, judges are troubled by judicial review of
initiatives. Some of them personally believe the initiative to be
more democratic than the legislature and give it more defer-
ence. Others sense that overturning an initiative is more likely
to incur popular wrath than overturning a legislative act. This
inhibits the timid, particularly in states where recall of judges
is allowed.57
D. Efficiency
When the initiative was adopted during the Progressive
Era, government in America was much smaller than it is today.
Government internally was not a major target of reformers;
rather, it was thought to be the tool of powerful private inter-
ests. Proponents of the initiative tended to be on the political
left, more concerned about private power than public, and
indeed, wanting to increase the ability of public power to
53. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 184-86.
54. See THE FEDERALIST. Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
55. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 5, at 92.
56. See SCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 38.
57. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1579-84.
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improve the lot of have-nots.58 Thus attacking governmental
inefficiency was not a prominent aim of original promoters of
the initiative, although it had occasional mention. 9
In recent years, attacking the size and inefficiency of gov-
ernment has become a major purpose of initiators.6" Also, the
initiative arguably reduces what economists call agency
costs-the costs of supervising agents, here elected representa-
tives and appointed bureaucrats, by a principal, here the elec-
torate. More controversially, some economists, dubbed "Levia-
than theorists," have argued that modern representative
government has an inherent bias toward excessive budget
size.6
Fully assessing all arguments about the relationship of the
initiative to governmental efficiency presents many difficulties.
Formidable questions include what definition of efficiency to
apply and whether efficiency is a coherent concept in various
contexts. However, the most serious and obvious class of prob-
lems is rather clearly connected to governmental efficiency.
These are problems arising from self-interest of the governing
classes, both elected and appointed, in their compensation, job-
security, power, and prestige. Agency costs are very likely to be
high on this class of issues.
The attentiveness of legislatures to minority interests has
the virtue, already noted, of giving effect to the intensity of
preferences, to which majorities are deaf. But that virtue
comes at a cost because legislatures try to satisfy all well-
organized interests at their door, often by spending or protec-
tionism at the expense of unorganized taxpayers or consumers.
And legislators do this in large part for the self-interested
purpose of garnering reelection support from organized groups.
The initiative is deployed as a remedy for these costs, at
least on behalf of taxpayers. In modern times, initiatives to
limit governmental borrowing and taxing have become promi-
nent, curbing legislators' ability to buy favor with organized
groups. The job-security interest of legislators has also been
58. See MAGLEBY, supra note 4, at 21-25; CRONIN, supra note 5, at 43-59.
59. E.g., ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Nov. 3, 1910, at 1 (cartoon).
60. See CRONIN, supra note 5, at 203-07; SCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 125-45.
61. See Geoffrey Brennan, Tax Limits and the Logic of Constitutional
Restrictions, in TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 121 (Helen F. Ladd & T.
Nicolaus Tideman eds., 1981); Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J.
POL. ECON. 571 (1959).
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the target of initiatives on reapportionment, term limits, and
campaign finance regulation.62
Claims to improve governmental efficiency must reckon the
cost of direct democracy itself. Initiatives incur administrative
costs to review, verify, and print petitions, print ballots, and
administer more elaborate, and sometimes more frequent, elec-
tions.6 Moreover, there are gains from agency that can be
lost when laws are made by initiative. It is cheaper for a few
officials to become fully informed about an issue, or expert in an
activity, than for the electorate as a whole. To sustain a claim
of efficiency for the initiative, these costs must be exceeded by
gains in governmental efficiency flowing from initiated mea-
sures. Gains seem likely in the discrete class of issues directly
related to the self-interest of legislators and bureaucrats, but
are more doubtful for other questions.
The Leviathan theorists make a theoretical case for greater
efficiency under direct democracy than under representative
government." We have found no good studies to test whether
their claim has empirical support. There is abundant political
commentary, particularly about California. All agree that the
state's tax-cutting initiatives have succeeded in reducing taxes
and government spending. But some argue that the crudeness
of initiatives, and their use to mandate spending priorities as
well as tax cuts, have led to less efficient government.65
One very crude question about efficiency of government is
its per capita cost. Higher cost does not equate with ineffi-
ciency, because it may correspond with better services. Yet the
suspicion that higher average costs mean less efficiency is wide-
spread.66 Thus we compared the per capita cost of state
government in states with and without the initiative. Initiative
62. See Ranney, supra note 5, at 78; CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at
.72-73; SCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 15, 30-34, 51-54, 108.
63. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 121, 126, 243. In every state,
initiative proponents bear the costs of circulation, which can be considerable. In
1994, an unsuccessful Colorado initiative, Amendment 12, sought to shift this cost
to the state. 1994 Amendment 12 (rejected by Colorado voters Nov. 8, 1994) (on
file with the Colorado Secretary of State).
64. See Arthur T. Denzau et al., On the Initiative-Referendum Option and
the Control of Monopoly Government, in TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS, supra
note 61, at 191.
65. See, e.g., Peter Schrag, California's Elected Anarchy, HARPER'S MAG.,
Nov. 1994, at 50.
66. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd, Introduction to TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITA-
TIONS, supra note 61, at 2.
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states are somewhat above average in taxing and spending, so
the initiative does not seem to curb taxing and spending better
than the representative process in any absolute sense.67
Studies of states that have initiated tax limits show significant
reductions in government spending over time,68 but we have
not found any study that compares efforts to control spending
through the initiative, such as in California, with efforts to do
so legislatively, such as that presently underway in New
Jersey. 9
Other claims that initiatives improve efficiency are occa-
sionally made. There are issues that deadlock the representa-
tive process, and the initiative can be a way to resolve them.
The most obvious and dramatic examples are tax revolt
initiatives in California and Colorado, which followed periods of
legislative stalemate.7 ° Some argue that the threat of an
initiative deters legislators and bureaucrats from self-dealing.
It is hard to substantiate this claim. Swiss practice shows that
the rescinding referendum has an important effect on the
legislative process, deterring passage of bills by thin majorities
because of the threat that the legislators who voted against the
bill will promote a rescinding referendum.7' However, it is
difficult to know whether that threat promotes more efficient
government. It could have the opposite effect by inducing the
majority to buy off more legislative minorities.
67. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No.
GF/91-5, GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 1990-91, at 101-09 (1993) (computations on file
with authors).
68. See, e.g., DEAN STANSEL, CATO INSTITUTE, TAMING LEVIATHAN: ARE
TAXING AND SPENDING LIMITS THE ANSWER? (1994).
69. On California, see Schrag, supra note 65, at 50. On New Jersey, see
Christine Scissorhands, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 1994, at 32; Jim Florio's
Toughest Fight, THE ECONOMIST, May 2, 1992, at 38.
70. On California, see CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 9. On Colorado,
see S. Con. Res. 2, S. Con. Res. 6, S. Con. Res. 7, S. Con. Res. 8, S. Con. Res. 9, H.
Con. Res. 1002, 58th Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1991) (failed tax limiting
measures).
71. See Blankart, supra note 14, at 91.
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IV. "THE DEVIL'S IN THE DETAILS": 72 THE DESIGN OF
INITIATIVE PROCEDURES WITH A SPECIAL Focus ON
COLORADO
A. Introduction
1. Four Basic Procedural Issues
States with initiatives must specify procedures for initiating
a popular measure. The procedures selected have their roots in
state constitutions, enabling legislation, and judicial decisions.
The ease or difficulty of qualifying an initiative for the ballot is
based, at least in part, on an important policy question
regarding the seriousness of ballot measures. There is a
general assumption that initiators ought to be able to demon-
strate substantial public support before the state is put to the
expense of conducting a vote. Also, proliferation of ballot
measures reduces citizens' understanding. States have chosen
the petition process as the primary method of restricting ballot
access. This process requires a minimum number of registered
voters to sign petitions requesting state officials to place any
given measure on the ballot. The process is supplemented by
procedures to detect obvious petition fraud. States must also
decide on judicial review of these procedures, particularly for
review that might delay a vote.
Beyond qualifying procedures, regulation of initiatives is
concerned with three related issues: minimizing voter con-
fusion, defining the extent of legal change that can be made in
a single initiative, and informing voters on the issues. A
related subject on the last issue is the delicate matter of
controlling the influence of money. The first two questions are
closely related because voter confusion increases with the
length and complexity of an initiative. For an extreme exam-
ple, in 1948 California citizens proposed an initiative that
exceeded 21,000 words and would have rewritten much of the
state's constitution.7 3
72. H. Ross Perot. See Steve Whitworth, Clinton, Cabinet Takes Economic
Message to the People, UPI, Feb. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File (Perot's comment on President Clinton's economic recovery plan).
73. See McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
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The judiciaries of initiative jurisdictions have parallel
concerns and issues of their own. Can substantive questions
about initiatives be reviewed before a vote or only after? How
are courts to determine legislative intent of initiated measures?
In constitutional review, should courts treat initiated measures
with greater or less deference than given to ordinary legisla-
tion? Are initiatives a unique threat to minority rights?74 An
issue that has become prominent in California is how courts
should interpret conflicting initiatives that are both enacted,
the so-called counter-initiative question."v
Our interest here is regulation of initiatives. We are not
directly concerned with substantive judicial review. Therefore,
some of the judicial questions stated above are beyond the scope
of this article.
2. The Colorado Experience with Initiatives
In 1910 the citizens of Colorado voted to amend the
Colorado Constitution, adding a procedure empowering citizens
to initiate and pass constitutional amendments and laws.76
74. See generally Eule, supra note 2, at 1503.
75. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 306-12. See generally, K. K.
DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternate Citizen
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995).
76. Colorado citizens may, by petition, initiate laws or constitutional
amendments that become effective if passed by majority vote. See COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 1; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 to -133 (Supp. 1994).
[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the
polls independent of the general assembly.
The ... power hereby reserved by the people is the initiative.
... All elections on measures initiated by... the people ... shall
become the law or a part of the constitution, when approved by a
majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise, and shall take
effect from and after the date of the official declaration of the vote
thereon by proclamation of the governor, but not later than thirty days
after the vote has been canvassed.
COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 1(1), 1(2), 1(4).
The Colorado Constitution also reserves to its citizens the power to submit,
by petition, referendums on laws enacted by the General Assembly. Id. art. V,
§ 1(3). The power, however, does not apply to laws that the General Assembly has
declared "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety" (an emergency clause) and to laws that contain "appropriations for the
support and maintenance of the departments of state and state institutions." Id.
Since the General Assembly routinely attaches an emergency clause to its bills
invoking the public safety exception, and the Colorado courts have refused to look
behind the declaration, referendum by citizen petition has not occurred since 1932,
when the electorate rejected a legislative measure increasing the tax on
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Since that time there have been over 160 ballot initiatives to
amend the constitution and approximately sixty ballot initia-
tives to enact laws." The clear trend is towards the increas-
ing use of the initiative power, with an emphasis on proposals
to amend the constitution.78 Since 1976 there have been over
eighty constitutional initiatives (over one half of the total of all
oleomargarine. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by Governor, 181 P. 197 (Colo.
1919); Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 156 P. 1108 (Colo. 1916); In re Senate Resolution No.
4, 130 P. 333 (Colo. 1913); see also American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer,
33 F.3d 62 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition), reported at 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19136 (10th Cir. July 27, 1994) (use of emergency clause does not violate
the First Amendment).
Colorado also sports a complex system of initiatives and referendums at the
local level. The Colorado Constitution provides that the initiative and referendum
powers are also "reserved to the registered electors of every city, town, and
municipality as to all local, special, and municipal legislation of every character
in or for their respective municipalities." COLO. CONST. art. V., § 1(9). The
Colorado Constitution also provides for the amendment of home rule municipal
charters and for adoption of "any measure" by initiative. Id. art. XX, § 5. All
home rule charters must include referendum and initiative provisions. Burks v.
City of Lafayette, 349 P.2d 692, 694 (Colo. 1960).
Interestingly, the procedures for local initiatives deviate in substantial
respects from the procedures for state wide initiatives, demonstrating that there
is substantial disagreement among even initiative proponents in Colorado on the
best procedures for implementing the process. The General Assembly has
established an indirect initiative system for local governments. COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 1-40-127 to -129 (Supp. 1994). Five percent of the registered electors of a city
or town jurisdiction can, by petition, submit a proposed ordinance to the local
legislature. If the legislature refuses to adopt the proposal "without alteration"
within twenty days (or refuses to override an executive veto), id. § 1-40-128, the
proposed ordinance is put to the electorate at a regular or special election within
one hundred and fifty days. Id. § 1-40-129. A second difference is the treatment
of initiatives that generate local ordinances. Once a measure is adopted by initia-
tive, it can be amended or repealed only by initiative. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 5.
77.. A tally of all initiatives, successful and unsuccessful, is on file with the
authors. This paper cites Colorado initiatives by ballot number and year (e.g.,
1994 Amendment 12). The text of Colorado initiatives is available through the
Colorado Secretary of State's office. Where initiatives have been formally
incorporated into the Colorado Constitution, the appropriate article and section
numbers are also cited.
78. The reason for the modern popularity of constitutional initiatives and
the declining popularity of statutory initiatives is easy to understand; the petition
and vote requirements are the same for both, but a constitutional amendment by
initiative is more difficult to alter or repeal. It may be altered or repealed only
through a subsequent constitutional amendment (either initiated by the people or
referred by the General Assembly or by a constitutional convention). COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 1(1) (initiative and referendum power), art. XIX, § 1 (constitution-
al convention). Initiatives that enact laws may not be vetoed by the Governor but
may be altered or repealed by subsequent legislation passed by the General
Assembly and signed by the Governor as well as by subsequent initiated laws. Id.
art. V, § 1(4).
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amendment initiatives proposed since 1910) and only ten
statutory initiatives.79 Of these modern initiatives, about half
of the amendment proposals have passed, but only three
statutory initiatives have passed. 0
The more important of the successful initiatives to amend
the Colorado Constitution include amendments changing
procedures for recalling state officials, providing for appointed
rather than elected judges, setting home rule for cities and
towns, establishing a- state civil service, repealing state
Prohibition, creating a reapportionment commission to draw
state legislative districts, limiting the power of cities to annex
territories without a favorable vote of those in the territory
annexed, setting eight-year term limits for all state elected
officials, and establishing taxing and spending limitations on all
government districts.
The popularity of constitutional initiatives has caused the
Colorado Constitution to be lengthened substantially with lan-
guage one would not expect to find in the constitution of a
sovereign government. Examples of unusual constitutional sub-
jects added by initiatives include participation in the 1976
Winter Olympics,"' gambling for selected cities, 2 using se-
lected tax revenues only for roads, 3 old age pensions of one
hundred dollars a month for Colorado citizens, 4 nuclear
detonations, 5 preference for veterans on civil service ex-
ams, public funding for abortion, use of lottery funds for
state parks, 8 busing to achieve racial balance, 9 and English
79. See supra note 77.
80. In 1980 a proposal to create a Regional Transportation District passed;
in 1984 a voter registration act passed; and in 1992 an act prohibiting the hunting
of black bears by the use of bait or dogs or in the spring passed. COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 32-9-103(3.5), -109.5, -111, -112, -117 (Supp. 1994) (Regional Transportation
District); id. § 33-4-101.3 (Supp. 1994) (black bear hunting); Act effective Jan. 14,
1985, 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1793 (voter registration). See also supra note 77
(since 1984, 26 of 30 initiatives have attempted to amend the Colorado Constitu-
tion).
81. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20, art. XI, § 10 (both repealed).
82. Id. art. XVIII, § 9.
83. Id. art. XI, § 3. The section also contains very technical limitations on
the state's bonding authority.
84. Id. art. XXIV, § 6.
85. Id. art. XXVI.
86. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
87. Id. art. V, § 50.
88. Id. art. XXVII (creating the "Great Outdoors Colorado Program").
89. Id. art. IX, § 8.
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as the official language for the State.90 In the latest election,
proposals failed that would have added provisions on workers
compensation and a special tobacco tax.9'
Recently, however, initiative petitioners, recognizing the
power and permanency of amendments on the structure of
government, have proposed constitutional amendments that
relate to the election process and the general powers and
responsibilities of government officials. In 1992 and 1994, state
ballots included constitutional initiative proposals on limiting
taxing and spending powers of government absent a ratifying
vote,92 on election reform,93 on recall of state judges,94 on
initiative and referendum procedures,95 and on term limits for
elected officials.96
The Colorado Constitution contains selected procedural
requirements, 97 but most of the details of Colorado initiative
procedure are found in legislation supplementing the constitu-
tional language. 98 Recently, the General Assembly passed two
90. Id. art. II, § 30a.
91. 1994 Amendments 11 and 1 (both rejected by Colorado voters Nov. 8,
1994) (on file with Colorado Secretary of State).
92. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20 (Taxpayer's Bill of Rights). This provision
itself requires a vote of the people on every measure to increase taxes, borrowing,
or government spending. The required ballot measure can be referred by a
legislative body or initiated by citizens.
93. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF
1994 BALLOT PROPOSALS, RESEARCH PUB. No. 392, at 20 (1994 Amendment 12),
41 (1994 Amendment 15) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL] (both amendments
were rejected by Colorado voters Nov. 8, 1994) (full text of amendments on file
with Colorado Secretary of State).
94. Id. at 20 (1994 Amendment 12).
95. Id.
96. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 9(a), 11 (1994 Amendment 17) (adopted by
Colorado voters Nov. 8, 1994).
97. Article V, § 1, in several separate bits of language, generally empowers
the General Assembly to enact implementing legislation, specifically empowers the
Secretary of State of prescribe the form of petitions, and specifically empowers the
General Assembly to pass laws on publication. In subsection (2), the General
Assembly may prescribe the "form" or, in subsection (7) "all matters pertaining to
the form" of initiative petitions and, in an odd bit of language in Subsection (7),
may, through "general laws" guide the Secretary of State on "submitting"
initiatives "to the people for adoption or rejection at the polls." Subsection (7.3)
states that the "form and manner of publication shall be as prescribed by law."
Under subsection (6), the Secretary of State can designate or prescribe the
"general form" of the "top" of the "printed or written" petition "sheets." Subsection
(5.5) impliedly authorizes the ballot title statutes.
98. The courts have interpreted the general grants of legislative authority
to authorize the General Assembly to pass statutes that "prevent fraud, mistake
or abuse in the initiative process," but the statutes may not "create an undue
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major overhauls of the implementing legislation, one in 198999
and' another in 1993.100 Occasionally, as this year, the Gener-
al Assembly proposes constitutional amendments, complete with
contingent legislation, to amend the initiative process. 10' The
implementing legislation must, of course, be consistent with the
constitutional language, and according to the courts, the
General Assembly has overstepped its constitutional authority
with some regularity over the years. 102
Colorado answers the four basic procedural questions in the
following manner. First, in accord with all other initiative
jurisdictions, Colorado limits access to the ballot through a
petition requirement. Registered voters, equal in number to
five percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates
for the office of secretary of state at the previous election, must
sign a petition requesting that specified language be put on the
ballot to amend the constitution or enact a law. With the
petition requirement comes, of necessity, a host of supplement-
burden on the exercise of the initiative process." See, e.g., Committee for Better
Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1992). The
General Assembly has passed Article 40, in its current version a 34 page, 35
section provision on initiative procedures. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 to -133
(Supp. 1994). The procedures specified are complex and the time deadlines short.
Only the most committed or the best advised members of the public are able to
negotiate the maze.
99. Act effective June 10, 1989, ch. 42, 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 319.
100. Act effective May 4, 1993, ch. 183, 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws 676.
101. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 93, at 2 (1994 Referendum A), 5
(1994 Referendum B) (adding subsections (5.5), (7.3) and (7.5) and amending old
subsection (7) to art. V, § 1 of the Colorado Constitution) (both adopted by
Colorado voters Nov. 8, 1994).
102. E.g., American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, No. 93-M-1467,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17134 (D. Colo., Nov. 23, 1994) (requirement that paid
circulators wear badges and that proponents report their names, addresses, and
payments invalid); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (prohibition on the
use of paid petition circulators violates First Amendment); Urevich v. Woodard,
667 P.2d 760, 763 (Colo. 1983) (dictum that prohibition on paying petition
circulators for soliciting contributions would be void); Francis v. Rogers, 514 P.2d
311, 313 (Colo. 1973) (for municipal referendum petitions, qualified electors need
not be registered voters to sign a referendum petition); Colorado Project-Common
Cause v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 220, 223 (Colo. 1972) (statute requiring petition
circulators and petition signers to be registered voters void); Colorado Project-
Common Cause v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 218, 219 (Colo. 1972) (law requiring
publication expense to be borne by petitioners void); Yenter v. Baker, 248 P.2d
311, 317 (Colo. 1952) (requirement that petitions be filed eight months before an
election void); Baker v. Bosworth, 222 P.2d 416, 419 (Colo. 1950) (requirement
increasing the minimum petition signatures void); In re House Resolution No. 10,
114 P. 293, 296 (Colo. 1911) (legislation on publication void).
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ing rules designed to deter and detect petition fraud and other
petition irregularities. Second, to minimize drafting problems,
Colorado requires proponents to submit to a non-binding consul-
tation procedure with state officials. Third, Colorado's efforts
to notify citizens on the content of initiatives consist of an
elaborate ballot title procedure, newspaper publication of the
text, an official summary of initiatives, and a pamphlet mailed
to all registered voters containing the text and an official
summary of initiatives. Fourth, until 1994, Colorado had no
regulation of the scope of initiatives, but a successful 1994
referendum amended the constitution to add a single-subject
limit.
10 3
B. The Petition Process as a Gate to Ballot Access
1. Introduction to the Petition Process
The process of qualifying an initiative for the ballot varies
greatly among jurisdictions, for both policy and practical
reasons. States allowing only the indirect initiative require
that a measure first be considered by the legislature, necessari-
ly slowing the process.' 4 Even in direct initiative states, the
time periods to qualify for the ballot vary substantially.'
The most central part of the qualifying process is gathering
voters' signatures on petitions, and the number of qualifying
signatures has a major effect on the frequency of citizens' resort
to the initiative. Some states set high qualifying numbers, or
set significantly higher numbers for constitutional than for
statutory initiatives.' s In others, the number is low enough
that qualifying is not difficult. 107
The size of a state's population has a great effect on the
qualifying process. California requires a higher percentage of
voter signatures to qualify a constitutional initiative than does
103. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 93, at 2 (1994 Referendum A)
(providing summary of proposed referendum); see also infra part IV.D.2.
104. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
105. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 130, 361 (from 90 days in
Oklahoma to unlimited time in five states).
106. See id. at 130, 361-62 (all but two states require more signatures for
constitutional than for statutory initiatives).
107. See id. Colorado is the easiest state in which to qualify a constitutional
initiative and may also be the easiest for statutory initiatives.
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Colorado.' °8 In California, the actual number needed is over
600,000109-about eleven times Colorado's. The logistics of
gathering over half a million signatures are significantly
different from 55,000. Signature gathering is often an amateur
enterprise in Colorado, but it is mostly a commercial venture in
California. Signatures must be gathered personally in Colora-
do,10 but California allows solicitation by mail."' The pro-
cess of administrative review of a proposed initiative can be
very complex and can cause difficulties for those unfamiliar
with it. Knowledgeable opponents can seek judicial review at
strategic moments to cause substantial and sometimes fatal de-
lay to an initiative."2
2. The Colorado Petition Procedure
As noted above, ballot access for initiatives is limited by a
petition requirement. After the fixing of the ballot title,
submission clause, and summary, proponents have no more
than six months to gather signatures and file their petition
with the Secretary of State."' They must then file completed
petitions at least three months before the election." 4  The
constitution requires "signatures by registered electors in an
amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of
votes cast for all candidates for the office of secretary of state
at the previous general election" for an initiative petition., 5
A series of provisions in the Colorado Constitution deals
with the form of the petition itself. Every petition must include
the full text of the measure proposed," 6 and signers must be
"proper persons" who sign for themselves and the signatures
must include a residential address and date."7 Petition
circulators must be registered electors and must attach a nota-
rized affidavit to each petition attesting that "each signature
thereon is the signature of the person whose name it purports
to be and that, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the
108. Id. at 130.
109. Id. at 126.
110. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
111. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 137-42, 151-55.
112. See infra text accompanying note 238.
113. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-108 (Supp. 1994).
114. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(6).
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affiant, each of the persons signing said petition was, at the
time of signing, a registered elector."" 8
Supplementing legislation adds that persons circulating
petitions must do so in person. 9 Circulators do not have to
know the signers personally. 2 ' A provision recently held un-
constitutional by a federal district court had required circula-
tors to wear badges identifying themselves and designating
whether they were volunteer or paid circulators.' 2 ' Each
circulator must sign, date, and have notarized an affidavit
containing information about the circulator's address and status
as a registered voter.'22
The required form for petitions is cumbersome. Each
individual petition for a single initiative, defined as a "sec-
tion,"2 ' must begin with pages containing a specified warning
statement, 24 the title, the summary, the ballot title (which in
large part repeats the title), and the proposed language. 2 5
The top of each succeeding page, on which signatures are
affixed, must repeat the warning statement and the ballot title
(or title for a local ballot issue). 26  The final page must
contain the affidavit of the petition circulator.'27
Upon receiving the petitions, the Secretary of State has
thirty days to check the form of the petitions. The Secretary of
State verifies that the petitions are prepared on printed forms,
118. Id.
119. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-111(2), -112(1), -113(1) (Supp. 1994).
120. Brownlow v. Wunsch, 83 P.2d 775, 781 (Colo. 1938).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(2) (Supp. 1994). This requirement was
held to violate the First Amendment. American Constitutional Law Found. v.
Meyer, No. 93-M-1467, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17134 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 1994),
appeal docketed, No. 94-1576 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 1994).
122. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-111(2) (Supp. 1994). See Committee for Better
Health Care for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884, 893-94 (Colo. 1992)
(requirements do not violate Colorado Constitution).
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-102(6) (Supp. 1994).
124. Id. § 1-40-110. The warning statement contains two parts. First, it
warns that it is against the law to forge another's name, to sign more than once,
or to sign knowing the signer is not a registered elector. Second, the statement
commands that a voter not sign unless the voter has read the proposed initiative,
or a summary thereof, and understands its meaning.
125. Id. § 1-40-102(6). Petition circulators have reported that no one reads
the text or summary of initiatives in their petitions and that the warning would,
if enforced, disqualify all signers on all petitions. See JoElyn Newcomb and
audience, Tape of Conference on Governing by Initiative, sponsored by the
University of Colorado School of Law (Sept. 23, 1994) (on file with authors).
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-102(6) (Supp. 1994).
127. Id.
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include the warning, contain no extraneous material, show no
evidence of disassembly,'28 and have sections bound by the
hundreds. The Secretary must also verify that petition
circulators have signed, notarized, and dated appropriate
affidavits. Finally, the Secretary must sample at least five
percent or four thousand signatures, whichever is greater.'29
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the constitutional
requirement that a properly verified petition "shall be prima
facie evidence that the signatures thereon are genuine and true
and that the persons signing the same are registered elec-
tors"' does not prohibit the Secretary of State from investi-
gating the validity of signatures of circulators and petition
signers.' 3'
If the Secretary of State declares that a petition does not
have a sufficient number of valid signatures, the proponents
have fifteen days to gather additional signatures. 3 2 Parties
contesting the Secretary's finding on the sufficiency of signa-
tures may file a protest within thirty days in district court with
an appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court. 3 The Colorado
Supreme Court has ruled that the Secretary's rejection of
petition signatures was arbitrary and capricious3 and has
128. See id. § 1-40-113(2); Elkins v. Milliken, 249 P. 655 (Colo. 1926) (ev-
idence of disassembly of sections destroys the integrity of each section).
129. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-116(4) (Supp. 1994). Random sample results
are extrapolated to the full number of signatures and used to make one of three
determinations of the petition's validity. If the random sample establishes that
the number of valid signatures is less than or equal to 90% of the number needed,
the petition "shall be deemed to be not sufficient." Id. If the sample established
that the number of valid signatures is equal to or greater than 110% of the
number needed, the petition "shall be deemed sufficient." Id. For anything
between, the Secretary "shall order the examination and verification of each
signature filed." Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
130. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(6).
131. Committee for Better Health Care for all Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 830
P.2d at 884, 895 (Colo. 1992).
132. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-117(3)(b) (Supp. 1994). See Montero v. Meyer,
795 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1990) (amended petition may be filed within three months of
election, but case decided under prior law before § 1-40-117(3)(b) was adopted).
133. COLO. REV. STAT. 88 1-40-118, -119 (Supp. 1994). The protestor must
plead specific defects in the Secretary of State's signature verification results and
has the burden of proof in the hearing. Id.
134. Committee for Better Health Care, 830 P.2d at 884, 896-97, 898-99
(reversing Secretary of State's rejection of petition forms, where Secretary
assumed that initiative sections with extra staple holes had been disassembled,
and Secretary rejected affidavits that had different dates for the signature and
notarization).
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also ruled that the Secretary of State's acceptance of signatures
was unreasonable. 135  In most cases, however, the supreme
court has sustained the Secretary's determinations.
136
3. Comments on the Colorado Petition Process
Drafters of the Colorado Constitution limited ballot access
by requiring, as a condition to appearing on the ballot, the
signatures of a significant number of registered voters. But the
petition process is open to fraud and misrepresentation. Those
gathering signatures can forge them (copy them from telephone
books), or solicit signatures from individuals who lack'capacity
to sign (individuals who are not registered voters in the appro-
priate jurisdiction), or solicit signatures from individuals under
false pretenses. The last category includes clearly actionable
conduct by those soliciting signatures, such as reattaching
signatures solicited for one petition to another, altering petition
language after signatures have been solicited, and the like. It
also includes conduct that is borderline illegal, like oral
misrepresentations or material omissions about the content and
effect of the initiative to induce individuals to sign otherwise
accurate and legally compliant petition forms.
Initiative proponents do not have a monopoly over question-
able behavior in the petition process. Opponents of initiatives
have been known to offer to pay signature solicitors, particular-
ly those that are paid solicitors, more per signature to destroy
already gathered signatures than the solicitors will make per
signature if they turn in their petitions."' Moreover, propo-
nents of one initiative, needing paid solicitors to gather
signatures, have hired signature solicitors off the street who are
doing the bidding of proponents of another initiative.
The Secretary of State's office reports that the incidence of
petition fraud in Colorado appears to be on the increase.
18
135. Elkins v. Milliken, 249 P. 655 (Colo. 1926) (invalidating signatures
where petition sections separated and altered).
136. E.g., Billings v. Buchanan, 555 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1976) (validating
petition forms distributed in newspapers); Haraway v. Armstrong, 36 P.2d 456
(Colo. 1934) (improper actions of one circulator did not invalidate all signatures
collected by that circulator).
137. This is illegal if the petition signatures gathered are not returned to
the original employer. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-131 (Supp. 1994).
138. See Catharyn Baird, Tape of Conference on Governing by Initiative,
supra note 125. In 1982, the Secretary of State ordered a controversial casino
gambling proposal removed from the ballot. Secretary of State Rejects Petition
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The use of circulators paid on a commission basis by signature,
illegal in Colorado until a 1988 Supreme Court opinion,'39 is
one of the reasons for the trend. Currently a single citizen with
an extra $40,000, fifty cents a signature for eighty thousand
signatures, has a good chance of putting an initiative on the
state-wide ballot using paid solicitors. The state legislature has
applied a minor salve by requiring paid solicitors to identify
themselves. 14o
The State's main protection against forged signatures and
signatures of unregistered voters is not signature verification
from filed signature cards and the like. There are simply too
many signatures on too many petitions to check them individu-
ally. Instead, the Secretary of State's office has relied on cross
checks of a random sample of signers against local voter rolls.
If a signed name and address do not match the name and
address on a voter roll, the signature is rejected. Some critics
argue that the process is too easily abused.'4 ' For example,
an unscrupulous petition circulator could forge signatures equal
in number to 125% of the minimum required, gathering them
from a phone book (or other mailing lists that can be bought
commercially) and assuming that seventy percent of the people
listed were registered voters and that the names and addresses
in the phone book match local voter rolls. Only careful
attention to ink color and handwriting and the like would detect
the fraud.
Other critics contend that the random sample process
results in the rejection of too many valid signatures for
technical errors that ought to be excused.' Some signatures
are rejected because there is not a perfect match between the
petition signature and address and the voter rolls. There can be
Effort, UPI, Sept. 10, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File.
Testimony indicated that some names were forged and others added after petitions
were notarized. Id. Petitions were left in bars and many names appeared in
alphabetical order. Id.
139. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). See discussion infra note 311.
140. The rule is currently of questionable constitutional status. See supra
note 121 and accompanying text.
141. Catharyn Baird, Tape of Conference on Governing by Initiative, supra
note 125.
142. This is a common complaint of Colorado initiative activist Douglas
Bruce and led him to propose an initiative in 1994 (Amendment 12) that, among
other things, would have stopped the Secretary of State from using the random
sample process. The initiative failed. See supra note 93.
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a registration error in the voter rolls or an error in the petition
signature, or the signature, although accurate, may not be a
perfect match with the form of the voter rolls (when, for exam-
ple, a signer uses a middle initial and a full name appears on
the rolls). Some signatures are rejected because voting rolls
have yet to be updated to correspond with a change of address.
Proponents can contest the rejection of these signatures, al-
though this is difficult, or simply use the fifteen-day grace
period to gather others.
The results of the sample are extrapolated to the full
number of signatures for an evaluation of whether the initiative
meets the minimum signature requirements. To protect their
initiatives, petitioners solicit excess signatures (if 55,000 is the
minimum, they will file 80,000) so that disqualification of some
signatures (in this example, a twenty-nine percent error rate)
would leave the petitions with sufficient signatures.' The
effect of the random sampling process is to induce proponents
to tender substantially more than the minimum number of
required petition signatures. With the large numbers involved
and the limited staff of the Secretary of State's office, however,
the verification process using the random sample seems a
reasonable compromise.
C. Drafting Initiatives: Amateurism, Ardency, and
Inadequate Review
1. Introduction to the Drafting Problem
There are four separate drafting problems. First, initia-
tives can be ineptly written: internally inconsistent, full of
lacunae, incoherent, or leading to unintended consequences.
Second, initiative drafting does not allow room for compromise
with targeted (and often minority group) opponents. Third,
initiatives can be mischievous; they can be intentionally mis-
leading in their complexity or opaqueness. Fourth, when
several initiatives pass that contain conflicting individual
provisions, the result can be a patchwork monster of regula-
tions. The initiative with the most votes pre-empts contrary
143. Newcomb, Tape of Conference on Governing by Initiative, supra note
STRUCTURING BALLOT INITIATIVES
provisions of any other initiatives that pass with lesser
majorities,' but a fragmentary, maimed residue of the other
initiatives may survive. 45
The problem of inept drafting arises in large part from the
way initiatives are drafted. A group of citizens comes up with
a draft provision. The group can be small, and they are likely
to be very strong partisans of their proposal. They can be
inexperienced in the drafting of legislation. They can work in
secret. After some procedural steps, their draft is printed on
petitions for circulation to voters. From that moment, the draft
is frozen.'46  Both petition signers and voters must accept or
reject the proposal as is.
The contrast with representative democracy could not be
starker. When a legislative bill is introduced, it may get review
from a legislative counsel or administrative department. It will
often go to a committee that includes members of both major
parties. It will undergo hearings, at which both expert and lay
witnesses testify. Opponents will have an opportunity to ex-
plain what parts of the bill are most objectionable to them and
to make amendments, and this will often result in changes.
Unintended consequences of the bill will often be brought to the
sponsors' attention. Possible costs of the bill will be estimated
and discussed, and more amendments may result. Ambiguities
will be pointed out and clarified. The process will be more or
144. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-123 (Supp. 1994). "A majority of the votes cast
thereon shall adopt any measure so submitted, and, in case of adoption of
conflicting provisions, the one which receives the greatest number of affirmative
votes shall prevail in all particulars as to which there is a conflict." Id. (emphasis
added).
145. In the 1994 election an initiative (Amendment 12) had language in
conflict with both another initiative (Amendment 15) and a referendum
(Referendum A). Amendments 12 and 15 contained conflicting provisions on
campaign finance reform, and Amendment 12 and Referendum A conflicted on the
single-subject rule for initiatives. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 93. If all
three had passed with different majorities, we would be left with bits and pieces
of the least successful provisions on the books, a result no one wanted. For
example, Amendment 12, with multiple issues, could have pre-empted Referendum
A, with a single issue, although one could argue that the result should be the
opposite because voters were voting for Amendment 12 on other grounds and
disagreed with Amendment 12's position on the Referendum A issue.
146. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105(2)
(Supp. 1994). But see id. § 1-40-120 (allowing later amendment to comply with
federal law). See generally CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 92-96, 99-107.
On withdrawal of initiatives by proponents, see infra notes 158, 172 and
accompanying text.
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less open. When the process works properly, the bill will un-
dergo genuine deliberation by a body that includes opponents
and neutral members as well as backers. Bicameralism and the
executive veto repeat the process. Representative democracy
suffers many instances when these processes do not work as
ideally intended, but even in an imperfect world, they are very
different from drafting of initiatives. Except for executive veto,
the same drafting safeguards are in place for a legislative
referendum.'47
As this discussion suggests, several problems arise from the
way initiatives are drafted. The most obvious is that initiatives
are more likely than legislation to be drafted badly. Less
expertise is brought to bear, and a small group of proponents
will overlook unintended effects and ambiguities more often
than will the broad range of interests present in the legislative
process. 148
The drafting problem is severely magnified by early freezes
of initiatives' wording. The many opportunities for adjustment
in the representative process are lacking. Moreover, entrench-
ment of enacted initiatives makes later adjustment extremely
difficult. If the initiative is in the form of a constitutional
amendment, it can be altered only by the same process. If it is
nominally a statute, many states either disable legislative ad-
justments or require a super-majority in the legislature to make
them. 149 Fine-tuning a measure in the light of experience, a
common aspect of the legislative process, is difficult to imp6s-
sible.
A troublesome aspect of the drafting process is that it shuts
out minority comment and thus minority interests. Target
groups do not have an opportunity to make their case in the
drafting process; they can only campaign against the initiative
language before the electorate. By contrast, the representative
process often accommodates minority concerns during the
enactment process. (This is true to a greater extent in parlia-
147. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
148. See generally CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 79-91. The problem
is not new. See Hubert D. Henry, Popular Law-Making. in Colorado, 26 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 439, 448 (1954). Drafting problems can surface during the campaign
on an initiative that has already qualified for the ballot. For two dramatic
examples, see Christopher A. Coury, Note, Direct Democracy Through Initiative
and Referendum: Checking the Balance, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY
573 (1994).
149. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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mentary systems lacking judicial review, where accommodative
traditions are stronger than in the United States.) Opponents
of a bill can often persuade its backers to modify parts that are
most objectionable to opponents and least important to propo-
nents. The legislative process forces opposing sides to listen to
one another before wording is final. Two houses and a governor
must be satisfied. The initiative process does none of this.
Several methods are used to try to improve drafting of citi-
zens' initiatives. Most formal and successful is the indirect
initiative. Initiators must first submit their proposal to the
legislature for its review and possible action. The legislature
can employ its procedures to point out shortcomings of the
initiators' draft. It can enact an alternative measure or propose
an alternative by referendum. This procedure is one reason for
success of the Swiss national initiative. 5 ° An additional
procedure recommended by some critics is a public hearing on
the measure during or after petitioning.' 5 '
A second method is to require that a state official, such as
the attorney general or legislative counsel, review drafts of all
proposed initiatives and point out any shortcomings to the
initiators. Some form of this procedure is used in many initia-
tive states, including Colorado.5 2 However, this method is
much less thorough than legislative review. A more drastic
reform is to have the actual ballot measure drafted by a public
official, who is charged with carrying out the initiators' purpose,
and whose draft is subject to judicial review. This form is
presently used in New Zealand.'5 '
A third approach involves efforts to postpone freezing of the
initiative's text. One variation is to lengthen the period
between the initial submission and petitioning. It is very short
150. The Swiss system enacts few initiatives as such; it is much more
common for voters to enact legislative counterproposals or substitutes. See
KOBACH, supra note 4, at 87, 110. See generally id. at 70-121 (trends in the
exercise of direct democracy in Switzerland). See also CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra
note 9, at 104-07 (advisory legislative hearings after ballot qualification).
151. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 112-19.
152. Id. at 99-103. On Colorado, see also supra part IV.A.2. For the view
that this method is too expensive for California because of the number of
proposals, see CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 121.
153. Citizens' Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (N.Z. Stat. 1993 no. 101). This
statute provides for advisory referendums only.
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in some states, including Colorado."" Another is to allow
amendments by the initiators later in the process.155 The dif-
ficulty is how to allow alterations to the petitions citizens have
signed without undermining the integrity of petitioning.
However, if changes do not alter the essence of a proposal, they
can be allowed to clarify it or to correct unintended defects.
One purpose of each of the procedures discussed above is to
promote discussions and bargaining between initiators and
public officials to get better-drafted and more practicable
initiatives. An alternative to amendment of an initiative,
discussed in the last paragraph, is withdrawal of an initiative
after its proponents are satisfied by a legislative substitute.
The latter can, of course, be either a statute or a measure
submitted by the legislature for referendum. This practice is
well-established in Switzerland but rare in the United
States.' To make it work, it is important to know who has
the right to withdraw an initiative and how late in the process
this can be done. State laws are vague on these points.
Statutes use indefinite terms such as "proponents" to refer to
the persons who submit initiative proposals,'57 and it is
implicit that whoever controls signed petitions can withdraw an
initiative simply by failing to submit them to elections offi-
cials. ' But there are no rules to govern disputes among
persons claiming to be proponents. If bargaining with officials
becomes common, disputes are likely to arise.
Finally, drafting problems can be alleviated by lowering the
barriers to post-enactment amendment. If procedures for statu-
154. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 130. On Colorado, see infra text
accompanying note 300.
155. See generally CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 109-19 (amend-
ability of initiatives).
156. Swiss legislation allows withdrawal of an initiative by majority decision
of the sponsoring initiative committee. See KOBACH, supra note 4, at 104. On the
United States, see CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 91-94, 99-107. The best-
drafted American attempt at the procedure is the new Mississippi provision. MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-17-29 to -37 (Supp. 1994).
157. E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3502 (Supp. 1994) ("proponents" are persons
presenting draft petition).
158. California proponents may formally withdraw their petition before
filing if they all sign the notice. Id. § 5354. (On Colorado, see infra note 172 and
accompanying text.) Under the California statutes, suppose that three people
claim to be proponents and two want to withdraw a proposed initiative. Section
5354 seems to say that the withdrawal is ineffective. What then if the two refuse
to file petitions in their possession, or even destroy them? What if there is a
dispute about who is properly called a proponent?
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tory initiatives were distinctly less burdensome than for consti-
tutional, the trend toward entrenching everything would likely
reverse. And legislatures can be given power to amend statuto-
ry initiatives, especially after an intervening election.
2. The Non-Binding, Consultative Procedures in
Colorado
As noted above, Colorado has a mandatory but non-binding
consultative procedure to improve initiative drafting enacted in
1974.159 The act followed on the heels of several unsuccessful
initiatives in the 1972 election on taxation and gambling issues
that were long, complicated and awkwardly drafted and
anticipated ultimately successful, technically sophisticated
initiatives in the 1974 election on annexation and reapportion-
ment. 6 ° Originally the comments were confidential until the
ballot title was established, but a 1980 constitutional amend-
ment made the comments public. 6' The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that the ballot title board has no jurisdiction to
set a ballot title unless the public comment and review proce-
dures have been followed.
162
The current version of this process requires that before the
solicitation of petition signatures, proponents must submit
proposed initiative language to the directors of the legislative
council and the office of legislative legal services for comment,
and the directors may request comments from other executive
agencies.163 Although proponents are not bound to accept any
suggested changes, the statute does have one exhortation and
two requirements pertaining to drafting style: The statute
encourages them "to write ... drafts in plain, nontechnical
language and in a clear and coherent manner using words with
common and everyday meaning which are understandable to
159. Act of May 14, 1974, ch. 66, 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 285 (repealing and
reenacting, as amended, COLO. REV. STAT. § 70-1-1 (1963)), repealed and
superseded by COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-105, -107 (Supp. 1994) (in the original
procedure the state attorney general rather than the directors of the legislative
council and the legislative drafting office were the official commenters).
160. See supra text following note 80.
161. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5).
162. In re Proposed Initiative Under the Designation "Tax Reform," 797 P.2d
1283 (Colo. 1990).
163. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105 (Supp. 1994). The directors are appointed
by, and answerable to, joint committees of the General Assembly. Id. §§ 2-3-301
to -508
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the average reader," requires that "drafts shall be worded with
simplicity and clarity and so that the effect of the measure will
not be misleading or likely to cause confusion among voters,"
and requires that "[t]he draft shall not present the issue to be
decided in such manner that a vote for the measure would be
a vote against the proposition or viewpoint that the voter
believes that he or she is casting a vote for .... 14
Thus far, perhaps because no complainants have made the
argument, Colorado courts have not viewed this statutory
language as a license to rule on the clarity of initiatives. The
Court has saved its time and attention for review of the
language of the ballot title and summary, both the work of the
ballot title board, which we explore below.
3. Comments on the Colorado Procedures
Colorado solutions to the drafting problems are anemic and
impractical. Legislation calls for clarity, coherency, and plain
language, but the only enforcement mechanism is the consulta-
tion system, which is seriously flawed. Every petition must be
submitted in draft form for official review and comment, but the
process is both too broad and too shallow. It is too broad
because every proposal must be reviewed, including the
frivolous and whimsical. Lacking any filing fee, there is no
deterrent to casual submissions. The process is too shallow
because it must be done in two weeks, and in practice state
officials do not comment on the merits of a draft. The directors
of the legislative council and the office of legislative legal
services, who review initiative drafts, are accountable to
powerful legislators of both parties and take pains to be
politically neutral on the merits of every proposal. As a conse-
quence, they routinely do not point out the effects of the draft
on existing law and practice, nor do they suggest alternative
language to cure substantive defects. Time pressure and their
caution confine their review to correcting grammar and simple
internal inconsistencies.'65 Drafters are not required to adopt
any of the reviewer's suggestions.
164. Id. § 1-40-105(1),(3).
165. The statute requires that reviewers suggest "editorial changes to
promote compliance with the plain language provisions of this section." Id. § 1-40-
105(1). However, this cannot be done effectively under the existing requirements
that every draft be reviewed in two weeks.
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The consultation system has not affected several recent,
poorly drafted initiatives, which are drafting nightmares. 66
The consequence of inept drafting has been a flood of litigation
as disagreements over the meaning of initiative language
inevitably end up in court. The tax and spending limitation
initiative passed in 1992 has generated a new, lucrative sub-
specialty for lawyers in municipal law, at taxpayers' ex-
pense.'6 1 City and county attorneys struggle to comply, often
by hiring outside counsel to advise on and defend against law-
suits. Litigation over the meaning of the language has proven
to be very costly and has held up projects clearly favored by
voters (school bonds, for example), adding significantly to the
projects' expense. 6  It will take years of judicial precedent to
work out some of the kinks in the more complicated of the
recent initiatives.
169
166. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20 (Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, 1992
Amendment One); 1994 Amendment 12 (rejected by Colorado voters, Nov. 8, 1994)
(on file with Colorado Secretary of State). See infra notes 174-75, 318-19.
167. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20, which has prompted over 60 lawsuits
since passage in 1992. See also Court to Decide Tax Cases: Amendment 1
Violations Alleged, DENV. POST, June 28, 1994, at B3. Two cases on a technical
procedural point (can a bond question and the tax to repay it be combined in a
single question on the ballot) have already reached the Colorado Supreme Court.
See Bickel v. City of Boulder, No. 94SA130, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 742 (Colo. Oct. 11,
1994) (consolidating the cases). See also Margot Duvall, Amendment One is
Causing Schools to Suffer, RocKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Oct. 9, 1994, at 95A
(outraged at proponents motion for rehearing adding more delay on local bonds).
168. See Mary George, Green Light for Bond Issue; Court: Amendment 1
Intent Fulfilled, DENV. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at Al (delay caused by litigation has
cost taxpayers $70 million in increased interest alone; delay also increased
construction costs and funds needed to buy land on which to build). See also Mary
George & Janet Day, Court Rejects New Bid to Halt Sale of Bonds: Amendment
1 Ruling Clears Way for Construction of New Schools, DENV. POST, Oct. 13, 1994,
at B1 (delay will cost Boulder Valley taxpayers $12 million in added interest). An
irony of the delays in implementing voter-approved projects is that proponents sold
Amendment One as a citizen empowerment scheme.
169. Courts expend much more political capital when they overturn initiated
measures than when they overturn legislative acts. Bickel was a rare decision in
which a court had to decide between two popular votes, spending political capital
either way. Bickel v. City of Boulder, No. 94SA130, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 742 (Colo.
Oct. 11, 1994). The court reviewed an'attack on compliance by local governments
with 1992 Amendment One, a constitutional initiative forbidding increases in
taxing, borrowing, or spending without voter approval. Four such measures had
been proposed by governments and approved by voters. The court rejected most
of the attacks by applying the election-law rule of substantial compliance to
technical aspects of Amendment One, and by interpreting an ambiguous provision
in favor of the governments. Id. One of us (Oesterle) thinks the court erred in
failing to read Amendment One strictly. The other (Collins) thinks the court
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Examples of mischievousness in initiatives are also not
hard to find. How could Colorado voters understand that the
words "any subject or subjects whatsoever" in the definition
section of an initiative (Amendment Twelve, defeated in the
1994 election) were intended by the initiative drafter to nullify
the single-subject requirement in a referendum on the ballot in
the same election (Referendum A, an amendment which
passed)?17 ° Citizens have standing to challenge successful
initiatives on the grounds that voters were misled, but the
burden of proof is very high and has never been carried.' 7 '
Colorado lacks any effective procedure to promote discussions
and bargaining between proponents and officials over drafting,
and between proponents and opponents. As noted above, an
effective procedure must allow amendment or withdrawal late
in the process, in case a compromise or clarification is decided
on. In Colorado, the right of amendment ends early, and the
right of withdrawal is unclear.'72
D. Scope of Initiatives
1. Introduction to the Problem of Multi-Issue
Initiatives
Long and complex initiatives can be criticized on three
grounds. First, constitutional stability is undermined by
initiatives that alter state government too much because initia-
reached the correct result. On problems of interpreting initiatives, see Eule, supra
note 2.
170. See supra note 145.
171. E.g., Glendale v. Buchanan, 578 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1978). For an example
of a successful challenge in another state, see Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 77
(Alaska 1972).
172. On amendment, see supra note 146. On withdrawal, see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 1-40-105 (Supp. 1994). "Proponents" are persons who submit draft
petitions and who file campaign reports. Id. §§ 1-40-105, -121. "Proponents" are
required to designate two "representatives" who can cure signature shortages or
federal law defects. Id. §§ 1-40-104, -117, -120. To be effective, signed petitions
must be filed within six months after fixing title and summary, id. § 1-40-108, and
at least three months before the general election date. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2).
Suppose A, B, C, D and E submit a draft petition and thus become "proponents."
At the same time, they designate A and B as their "representatives." Later, A and
B reach a compromise with legislators for withdrawal of the initiative in favor of
a legislative substitute. But C, D, and E disagree. Can there be a lawful
withdrawal? Can A and B lawfully refuse to file petitions in their possession, or
destroy them?
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tives can entrench a measure beyond the reach of the legisla-
ture. Second, voter confusion-and irritation-increases with
the length of an initiative.'73 The ballot title or summary be-
comes less representative of the full text, and the full text is
read and understood by fewer citizens. When a initiative is
long and complicated, joining several issues, it exacerbates the
problem of informing voters. The tendency to compress the
debates over initiative issues into thirty second television spots
means that the debate over multi-issue initiatives will focus on
one or two issues out of the five or six in the text of the
initiative. Voters will simply not know about, much less
understand in any depth, many of the sub-issues.'74
Third, long initiatives inevitably contain positions on mul-
tiple issues, which critics say should be divided for separate
votes so that citizens can say yes to one and no to another.
Bundling of issues is a recognized abuse within the representa-
tive process, and it is no less so in direct democracy. Even if
one assumes all voters know about and understand each of the
issues in a multi-issue initiative, they can be coerced by such
initiatives into placing language in the constitution that would
not have alone been supported by a majority.
To illustrate, assume an initiative with four separate
issues. A voter may be strongly in favor of issue one but
marginally against issues two, three and four. If she could vote
separately on each, she would vote yes on one and no on issues
two, three and four. But she does not have such a choice; it is
all or nothing. Does she vote yes, absorbing the cost of sup-
porting issues two, three and four? Or vote no, absorbing the
cost of opposing an issue she deeply favors? Many voters in
such a situation will vote yes. If a majority does so, the state
173. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 182-83.
174. 1992 Amendment One added over 1700 words to the Colorado
Constitution on taxation and spending limits. COLO. CONsT. art. X, § 20. The
Amendment requires voter approval of increases in tax and government spending
and of new government indebtedness. The theme of the campaign to pass the
Amendment was the empowerment of citizens. See, e.g., Douglas Bruce,
Amendment 1 Face-Off Initiative Puts Control Back in Hands of People, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS (Denver), Oct. 17, 1990, at 49. But hidden in the language were flat
prohibitions on government choice, even if ratified by a citizen vote. Examples
include prohibitions on new or increased transfer taxes on real property, on any
new state property tax, on any new local government income tax, on a state
progressive income tax, and on state general obligation bonds, and an incentive
for the sale of public land. See Dale Oesterle, Bruce's Hidden Agenda in
Amendment 1, DENV. POST, Dec. 5, 1992, at B15.
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constitution contains language favored by the majority, the text
of issue one, and language disfavored by the majority, the text
of issues two, three and four. In an extreme case, minority
supporters of several issues could join to pass an initiative
composed of parts which would all fail if offered to the electorate
alone.
The combination of the two disadvantages of multi-issue
initiatives gives petitioners a strategic opportunity. If petition-
ers want language that they know will not, alone, get a
majority vote, they can put the language in a multi-issue initia-
tive with several other issues that are hot, hoping one of the hot
issues will carry their language along with it into the state
constitution.175 They hope that those who would vote against
175. In passing Amendment One in 1992, the voters, as experience suggests,
wanted a taxation limitation but not a revenue limitation. Voters supported the
proposition that government should not increase taxes without a citizen vote. But
the success of many referendums to exempt local jurisdictions (and the overwhelm-
ing success of specific revenue retention measures) demonstrate that voters do not
in general favor a revenue limitation, which, among other things, requires
governments to give back tax revenues when revenues increase not because of
increased tax rates but because, for example, of increased economic activity, unless
voters approve revenue retention. Eric Anderson, Measures Try to Undo
Amendment 1: Cities Want to "De-Bruce" Tax and Spending Limits, DENV. POST,
Nov. 2, 1994, at B1 (forty-six de-Brucing questions on the November 8, 1994 ballot;
measures do not ask for tax increases, they allow government to keep money
received); Aldo Svaldi, Bond Issues Fly, While Taxes Die, DENV. Bus. J., Nov. 11-
17, 1994, at 1A, 38A (voters generally approved "de-Brucing" measures that
allowed government to keep excess revenues from old taxes but generally did not
approve requests for new or higher taxes; requests for new debt had a 62%
approval rate with school districts faring the best). Several propositions on
spending attempted to exempt selected local expenditures permanently from
Amendment One, moves of questionable legality under the language of the
Amendment. See Loveland Issue A and Issue B (both rejected by voters in
Loveland, Colo., Nov. 8, 1994) (on file with Loveland, Colo. City Clerk). Many
Colorado voters simply did not understand the details of the initiative beyond the
basic tax limit. Sarah Ellis, Pollster Says Voters Still Back Amendment 1; But
Many are in Dark About Law's Details, DENV. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at B3 (voters
did not know that measure would prevent city from keeping sales-tax revenues
from new outlet mall).
The mix of taxation and revenue limits in Amendment One is not just a
nuisance. It has serious effects. The combination creates a "ratchet down" effect
on both limits. Jeffrey A. Roberts, Tax-Limit Amendment Passes, DENY. POST,
Nov. 4, 1992, at Al (spending limits will ratchet down over time without voter
approval); see also Mark J. Shaw, Amendment 1: Bruce's Ratchet Creates
Confusion, Uncertainty, DAILY J., Jan. 27, 1993, at 2.
A humorous example is provided by Colorado's 1994 Amendment 13. In
1991, and again in 1993, voters in Manitou Springs rejected overwhelmingly an
amendment to the city charter to allow gambling in their city. A frustrated
potential casino owner put the issue on the state-wide ballot and, hoping to attract
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the petitioners' pet language if informed and focused on the
issue either will not know the language is in the initiative or
will not focus on the effect of the language because the hot
issue will dominate the short television spots. Those who do
focus on and understand the petitioners' pet language and
would vote against it if they could, may vote yes nevertheless
on the hot issue. Indeed, a failure in one election to have the
right mix of issues gives lessons for later elections. Eventually,
on the second or third try, petitioners will get the mix of issues
right and pass their total package'
17 6
In sum, multi-issue initiatives give opportunities to
proponents to put language in a state constitution, either by
accident or by design, that does not have majority support of
the voters.
Two methods are used to confine the scope of initiatives.
The more common is to limit the scope to a single subject or
single question. At least fifteen states, including Colorado, do
this in one form or another.'77 The same concept has long
been in use in many jurisdictions to limit the scope of bills in
legislatures.'78 Whether for direct or representative democra-
cy, this device is of limited utility because defining single
subject is highly subjective.
179
The single-subject limit on initiatives has greater effect
when review of the issue is made before a measure is put to a
vote. Once the electorate has passed a law, courts are very re-
luctant to throw it out for multiple subjects. A prominent
example was California's Proposition 8 in 1982, called the Vic-
tim's Bill of Rights. The measure covered a broad range of
state-wide support, tied it to a provision that would allow the operation of slot
machines in public airports. The measure failed. 1994 Amendment 13 (rejected
by Colorado voters Nov. 8, 1994) (on file with Colorado Secretary of State).
176. The citizens of Colorado voted on initiatives imposing taxation
limitations in nine successive bi-annual elections. The last three initiatives were
written by the same author, Douglas Bruce, and revised in light of circumstances.
See Roberts, supra note 175, at Al (The seventh and eighth initiatives, written by
Mr. Bruce, failed in 1988 and 1990). The ninth initiative, 1992's Amendment One,
passed. Id.
177. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 362 (at least 13 states;
Colorado and Mississippi adopted the rule thereafter). On Colorado, see infra
notes 184-94 and accompanying text. On Mississippi, see MISS. CONST. art. 15,
§ 273(2).
178. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 119 (1974).
179. See In re Tax Limitation, 644 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1994).
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matters, but the state supreme court solemnly pronounced it
consistent with the single-subject rule. 80
The other device to limit the scope of initiatives is a
creature of judicial inventiveness. When the California
Supreme Court reviewed a proposed 21,000 word initiative in
1948, it held that the state's initiative can be used to "amend"
but not "revise" the state constitution, and the proposed
initiative was a wrongful attempt at revision. 8' The state's
provisions for constitutional amendments used the word amend
when describing the initiative. When authorizing a constitu-
tional convention, the provision said amend or revise. The
court decided that this scheme implied a limit on the scope of
initiatives, and the proposal at issue exceeded the limit.'82
Several other state courts have invalidated referendums or
initiatives on the same rationale.
8 3
2. The Colorado Single-Subject Rule
Success in the 1992 Colorado election of a multiple issue
tax and spending limitation initiative and the prospect of
several multiple issue initiatives appearing on the ballot in the
1994 election led the General Assembly to propose a single-
subject rule by referendum. The referendum passed, in spite of
bitter opposition by the most active advocate and user of the
initiative process in the state.184 So Colorado now has a sin-
180. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982); see also Raven v.
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083-85 (Cal. 1990) (upholding validity of Proposition
115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," under the single-subject rule because
of its consistent theme); Steven W. Ray, Note, The California Initiative Process:
The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule, 14 PAC. L.J. 1095 (1983).
181. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 799 (Cal. 1948); see also Raven v.
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d at 1085-90.
182. McFadden, 196 P.2d at 799; see also Raven, 801 P.2d at 1085-90 (invali-
dating parts of one other initiative on same rationale).
183. State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864 (Ala. 1983); Opinion of the Justices,
264 A.2d 342 (Del. 1970); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970); Rivera-
Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1958); Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (Ind. 1912),
appeal dismissed, 23 U.S. 250 (1912); Miller v. Taylor, 133 N.W. 1046 (N.D. 1911);
Holmes v. Appling, 392 P.2d 636 (Or. 1964).
184. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5) (amended 1994). See infra note 313. See
also COLO. CONST. art X, § 20(4). Ironically Mr. Bruce argues, in essence, that his
successful 1992 initiative on tax reform contains a single-subject requirement. Mr.
Bruce sued, and lost, arguing that the language requires two votes on a single
bond issue, one vote for the bond issue and a second for the taxes that will support
the repayment. For Mr. Bruce, then, a single-subject rule ought to apply to tax
or spending requests by a government unit, but not to his personal initiative
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gle-subject rule for initiatives. Legislation accompanying the
referendum states that the single-subject rule is aimed at
"forbid[ding] the treatment of incongruous subjects in the same
measure, . . . for the purpose of enlisting in support of the
measure the advocates of each measure, and thus securing the
enactment of measures that could not be carried upon their
merits" and "[t]o prevent surreptitious measures and apprise
the people of the subject of each measure by the title ... to
prevent surprise and fraud."'85
A single-subject rule has long been in force for bills,'
except general appropriation bills, and case law on the require-
ment will now apply to all constitutional amendments, whether
by initiative or by referendum.8 7 An early Colorado Supreme
Court case explained the purpose of the single-subject require-
ment for legislation, and the arguments apply with similar force
to initiatives:
[I]t is important to bear in mind the evils sought to be
corrected .... The practice of putting together in one bill
petitions. See Bickel v. City of Boulder, No. 94SA130, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 742 (Colo.
Sept. 12, 1994).
185. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(I), (II) (Supp. 1994).
186. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 21.
187. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106.5(3) (Supp. 1994) ("[I]n setting titles...
the initiative title setting review board . . . should apply judicial decisions
construing the constitutional single-subject requirement for bills and should follow
the same rules employed by the general assembly in considering titles for bills.").
The statute's instruction to apply both judicial decisions and legislative "rules" for
single-subject review may create some conflict. According to the current director
of the office of legislative legal services, "the rules we use in our office [for single-
subject determinations] are stricter than the courts use." See Fred Brown, Keeping
the Ballot Constitutional, DENVER POST, Dec. 28, 1994, at 7B (quoting Douglas
Brown). This difference makes sense when one compares administrative review
of a bill with judicial review of an enacted law; courts give enacted laws a strong
presumption of constitutionality. E.g., In re House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d 371,
372 (Colo. 1987) (must show unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt").
Administrative review has an opposite incentive, to apply the single-subject
standard strictly to avoid later trouble in court or legislative debate. However, the
Colorado Supreme Court also review bills when referred by the General Assembly,
and no presumption of constitutionality applies. E.g., Submission of Interrogato-
ries on Senate Bill 93-74, 852 P.2d 1, 5 n.4 (Colo. 1993). Also, the Court has an
established practice of deferring to the title board. See infra text accompanying
note 222. Thus the statutory commands can be reconciled by applying the
legislative practice in the context of single-subject review by the title board,
including judicial review of the board. But when single-subject challenges are
made in litigation filed after passage of a measure (and thus long after title-board
approval), the judicial precedents with a presumption of constitutionality should
apply.
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subjects having no necessary or proper connection, for the
purpose of enlisting in support of such bill the advocates of
each measure, and thus securing the enactment of measures
that could not be carried upon their merits, was undoubtedly
one of the evils sought to be eradicated. Another object is to
prevent surprise and fraud from being practiced upon
legislators, and to apprise the people of the subjects of
legislation.'88
Courts applying the single-subject rule to legislation speak
simultaneously in the language of caution and in the language
of righteousness. They, on the one hand, presume a statute to
be constitutional and should not be declared invalid "unless
that conclusion is established beyond a reasonable doubt,"
189
and, on the other hand, state that the rule "must have a
reasonable and liberal" construction.' 90
In the end, one can rely only on the specific holdings of
individual cases to give meaning to the rule. An example of a
bill that the court found to be invalid is House Bill No. 1353, a
forty-four page, forty-six section bill. The bill, among other
things, reduced state contributions to state employees' retire-
ment funds, imposed charges on inmates for medical visits,
imposed a surcharge on insurance carriers based on workers'
compensation premiums, revised the statutory formula for
Medicaid reimbursements to nursing homes, provided for the
forfeiture of abandoned intangible property by banks, and elimi-
nated state aid for instructional television.' 9' The Colorado
Supreme Court held that the common characteristic of financial
savings did not save the bill. 192 On the other hand, the court
recently upheld a health care bill that prohibited certain
advertising practices and specified abuses of health insurance
by health care providers.'93 The court held that the advertis-
188. Catron v. Board of Comm'rs of Archuleta County, 33 P. 513, 514 (Colo.
1893).
189. In re House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d at 371.
190. Catron, 33 P. at 514 (the court also noted that the rule is "not designed
to hinder or unnecessarily obstruct legislation").
191. In re House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d at 372-73.
192. Id. at 373.
193. Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356 (Colo. 1988). The statute was aimed
at the practice of health care providers to waive their right to demand payment
of the deductible and co-payment features of insurance policies, relying instead on
the insurance coverage for full payment. Id. at 1359. The statute made the
practice a crime and prohibited health care providers from advertising that they
were willing to engage in the practice. Id. at 1360.
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ing prohibited and the abuse interdicted were connected,
"because the act of advertising is simply one means of alerting
patients that a health care provider is willing" to engage in the
abusive practice.'
E. Informing Initiative Voters
1. Introduction to the Problem of Voter Education
on Initiatives
Voter confusion in initiative campaigns can arise from
overly long initiatives, or from confusing and ambiguous draft-
ing, the subjects of the previous sections. It can also arise from
several other sources. An initiative's subject can be technical,
not apparent to citizens without special knowledge. There can
be so many initiatives and candidates that voters' capacity to
understand them is overwhelmed. And, as in all political cam-
paigns, there can be misleading claims made for or against a
measure, particularly in advertisements. Several measures to
address these problems are in common use.
Many initiative states require a public official to draft
ballot titles or captions for proposed initiatives. 9 s Many
states also require drafting of an official summary of each mea-
sure.'96 Some require an official assessment of the fiscal
effect of a proposal.'97 And a number of states publish and
mail to each voter an official pamphlet explaining each ballot
measure and outlining arguments for and against it. 198
The most important of these provisions is probably the
requirement of an official ballot title. When initiators can
impose their own title, the path is open to advertisers' gimmicks
to sell the initiative. As it is, initiators often advertise their
work under a label or title, such as "Save Our State," the name
194. Id. at 1362. More recently, the court held that a single referendum can
encompass both authority for bonded indebtedness and for taxes to repay it.
Bickel v. City of Boulder, No. 94SA130, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 742 (Colo. Oct. 11,
1994). See discussion supra notes 167, 169.
195. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 229, 231 (official caption in nine
states; official approval of proponents' caption in five; proponent writes caption in
two; no caption in eight).
196. Id. (official summary in nine states; official approval of proponents'
summary in four; proponent writes summary in four; no summary in five).
197. See id. at 235 (five states require fiscal impact analysis to be printed
in ballot information pamphlets); see also infra note 214.
198. See id. at 235-38.
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adopted by initiators of California's Proposition 187, intended
to forbid state services to aliens who are present in the state in
violation of immigration laws.'99 These are often misleading.
Florida initiators write their own titles and summaries, the
source of some controversy there.200 Summaries and pam-
phlets are also important for voters who take the time to read
them, and surveys show that some do.20'
As initiative ballots grow ever longer, the contrast between
American ballots and those in parliamentary nations becomes
sharper. In every state, we vote separately for a long list of
officials, and in initiative states, many ballot measures are
added on.2°2 In parliamentary systems, a voter simply choos-
es a party, which will represent her in all aspects of govern-
ment.203  For a literate and informed voter, the American
system has obvious advantages. For others, the question is
which system represents them better. The populists who led
the original push for the initiative in America were sure it
would improve the lot of have-nots.2 4  History has raised
substantial doubts.
2. The Influence of Money
Concern that money unduly corrupts the initiative process
is widespread. The subject has also been thoroughly stud-
ied.2°" For this reason, it is not a point of emphasis in this
paper. Our comments are limited to noting some regulations
199. Proposition 187 (adopted by California voters Nov. 8, 1994) to be
codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114, 834(b); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 10001.5, 130; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130; CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215,
66010.8; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.5.
200. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. Re Tax Limitation, 644
So.2d 486, 497 (Fla. 1994) (Overton, J., concurring).
201. CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 244-48 (pamphlets important for
educated voters).
202. See, e.g., id. at 182 (November 1990 ballot in Los Angeles had 36 ballot
measures).
203. See, e.g., 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Elections 516-17 (4th
ed. 1990) (contents of British parliamentary ballot).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
205. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 263-300; MAGLEBY, supra
note 4, at 145-51; JOHN SHOCKLEY, THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN COLORADO
POLITICS: AN ASSESSMENT (1980); BETrY ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASS
ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1982); Daniel H.
Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience,
Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982). On
recent Colorado spending, see infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
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that states have attempted to impose in order to limit distor-
tions thought to arise from spending on initiative cam-
paigns.
206
Some states have attempted to limit the influence of money
on the initiative process by limiting contributions to initiative
campaigns and by forbidding paid petition circulators.0 7
Several of these provisions have been struck down by courts
under the First Amendment.0 8 Others have proved ineffec-
tive. As a result, researchers who have studied the effect of
money on the initiative process conclude that it is at least as
great as on the representative process. 2 9  The only form of
regulation generally sustained by the courts is requirements to
disclose contributors and contributions to initiative cam-
paigns.2
3. The Colorado Notice Procedure: The Ballot Title,
the Ballot Information Booklet and Newspaper
Notices
Colorado relies on three types of public notice to get
information out to the electorate on initiative questions: the
ballot information booklet, the ballot title, and newspaper
notices. Of the three, the ballot title process is the most
important.
a. The Ballot Title Board Procedure
After their public meeting with the legislative council and
legislative legal services, proponents submit a final draft of
206. More dramatic proposals have been made. For an argument that the
"fairness doctrine" ought to apply to initiatives, see Robyn R. Polashuk, Protecting
the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fairness Doctrine in Ballot Initiative
Elections, 41 UCLA L. REV. 391 (1993) (the doctrine, among other things, would
require media to give free air time to the unfunded side of a ballot initiative
campaign).
207. See CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 296-301; see also infra note
311 and accompanying text.
208. E.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, No. 93-M-1467, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17134 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-1576 (10th
Cir. Dec. 16, 1994).
209. See CALIFORNIA COMMN, supra note 9, at 265-91.
210. Id. at 291. But see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990) (sustaining limit on spending by for-profit corporations).
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their initiative to the Secretary of State.21' The Secretary of
State convenes a "title board" consisting of herself, the Attorney
General and the director of the office of legislative services,
which meets in public, when there is business, on the first and
third Wednesdays of each month from the first Wednesday in
December after an election until the third Wednesday in May
in an election year.212  Proponents must submit their draft
twelve days before one of the Wednesday meetings.13 Within
two weeks, the title board,1 4 by majority vote, must draft a
title for the initiative ("which shall correctly and fairly express
the true intent and meaning thereof' and which "shall unam-
biguously state the principle of the provision sought to be
added, amended, or repealed"),215 a submission clause, and a
"clear, concise summary" which "shall be true and impartial and
shall not be an argument, nor likely to create prejudice, either
for or against the measure."212 The title board also has
responsibility to apply the new single-subject and clear expres-
sion requirements to ballot titles.217 If a measure contains
more than one subject, no title can be set.21
The importance of the title cannot be overstated. The title
and submission clause, together known as the "ballot title,"
appear on the ballot and on each page of the petition. Neither
211. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105 (Supp. 1994). A version of the ballot title
procedure has been in place since 1919. Act of Mar. 31, 1919, ch. 131, § 1, 1919
Colo. Sess. Laws 431. Originally the ballot title board consisted of the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General and the Reporter of the Supreme Court. Id. From
1913 to 1919, proponents wrote ballot titles. See infra note 296.
212. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-106(1) (Supp. 1994).
213. Id.
214. The board must request a "fiscal impact" statement from the office of
state planning and budgeting or the department of local affairs "if, in the opinion
of the title board, the proposed law or constitutional amendment will have a fiscal
impact on the state or any of its political subdivisions." Id. § 1-40-106(3)(a). The
target agency "shall furnish any assistance so requested," and the information
must be filed on the Friday before the Wednesday title board meeting at which'the
initiative is considered. Id.
215. Id. § 1-40-106(3)(b).
216. Id. § 1-40-106(3)(a). If the measure proposes to increase taxes or
government borrowing or spending, its title is regulated by a provision in the
Colorado Constitution added by citizens' initiative in 1992. COLO. CONST. art. X,
§ 20(3)(c).
217. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5) (amended 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-
106.5(3) (Supp. 1994).
218. COLO. CONST. art. V § 1(5.5) (amended 1994). In that event,
proponents may revise the measure, id., or sue. See infra note 223 and
accompanying text.
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the summary nor the language of the initiative itself is on the
ballot;219 they are on each petition and appear in the newspa-
per notices and ballot information booklets before the election.
Since the ballot title is so important, the statute provides for an
elaborate appeals procedure. Interested parties may file for a
rehearing before the title board within seven days after the
titles and summary are set.22 If protesters lose on rehearing,
they may, within five days, seek review in the Colorado
Supreme Court, which "shall" place the matter at the "head of
the calendar" and dispose of it summarily.22' Many ballot
title controversies end up in the Supreme Court of Colorado,
most brought by aggrieved initiative proponents, and a select
few brought by petition opponents, with the court upholding the
title board in all but a few cases.222 The same procedures
219. Measures referred by the General Assembly are listed by letter;
measures initiated by the people are listed numerically. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-
115(2) (Supp. 1994). "A 'yes' vote on any measure is a vote in favor of changing
constitutional or statutory law . .. ." Id. Only the ballot title appears on the
ballot. Id. § 1-40-115(1).
Colorado Constitution article V, section 1(5.5) refers to the ballot title and to
"officials responsible for the fixing" of it. But there is no explicit provision to put
only the title on the ballot, excluding the text. Article V, section 1 directs the
Secretary of State to "submit all measures initiated by or referred to the people for
adoption or rejection at the polls," COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (emphasis added), and
article XIX, section 2 directs that "amendments shall be submitted to the
registered electors." COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (emphasis added). One could
argue that these provisions require that the full text of an initiative appear in
ballots because a title is not a "measure" or an "amendment." Practice is clearly
to the contrary, however.
220. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-107(1) (Supp. 1994).
221. Id. § 1-40-107(2).
222. For the state-wide 1994 election alone, the Colorado Supreme Court
issued 13 opinions on ballot titles. In re Proposed Initiated Constitutional
Amendment Concerning "Fair Fishing," 877 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1994); In re Proposed
Initiated Constitutional Amendment Concerning the "Fair Treatment II," 877 P.2d
329 (Colo. 1994); In re Proposed Initiative on "Obscenity," 877 P.2d 848 (Colo.
1994); In re Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1994); In re
Petition on Campaign and Political Finance, 877 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1994); In re
Proposed Initiative Concerning "Automobile Insurance Coverage," 877 P.2d 853
(Colo. 1994); In re Proposed Initiative for an Amendment to Article XVI, Section
6, Colorado Constitution, Entitled "W.A.T.E.R.," 875 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1994); In re
Proposed Initiative Designated "Governmental Business," 875 P.2d 871 (Colo.
1994); In re Petition On School Finance, 875 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1994); In re Proposed
Initiative on School Pilot Program, 874 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1994); In re Proposed
Initiated Constitutional Amendment Concerning the Fair Treatment of Injured
Workers Amendment, 873 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1994); In re Proposed Tobacco Tax
Amendment 1994, 872 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1994); In re Proposed Election Reform
Amendment, 852 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1993). Only eight initiatives made the ballot.
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should apply when the title board refuses to set a title for a
measure that contains more than one subject.223
In reviewing ballot titles, the court typically notes that it
"will not address the merits of the proposed initiative; instead,
we give great deference to the Board's action in exercising its
drafting authority."224 Courts will set aside the language only
when it is "clearly misleading."225 The language "need only
fairly reflect the content of the measure."226 The court is
otherwise careful not to "interpret the meaning of proposed
language or suggest how it will be applied if adopted by the
electorate."227 "[Tihe Board is not required to include every
aspect of a proposed measure in the title and submission clause
.... )228 The court refuses to consider the constitutionality of
the initiative in the ballot title review process 229 or otherwise
consider challenges on the merits of the initiative proposal.23 °
The court's deference to the ballot title board's determina-
tions is consistent with the court's interpretation of the "clear
expression" requirement for titles of legislative bills. In Colora-
do, any given bill is limited to a single subject "which shall be
clearly expressed in its title" and "if any subject shall be
embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title,
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be
so expressed."23 ' The title of legislative bills is more often the
subject of litigation than the single-subject content require-
In all but two of the cases, the title board's action was affirmed. In re
Proposed Initiative Designated "Governmental Business," 875 P.2d 871 (Colo.
1994); In re Proposed Election Reform Amendment, 852 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1993)
(ballot title inaccurate).
223. The single-subject provisions say nothing about rehearing or judicial
review. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5) (amended 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-
106.5 (Supp. 1994). The statute governing rehearing and review says nothing
about review of refusal to set a title or single subject, but it seems broad enough
to apply. Id. § 1-40-107. If it applies, opponents as well as proponents should be
able to seek review when the title board finds that a measure contains more than
one subject.
224. In re Petition on School Finance, 875 P.2d at 210.
225. Id.
226. In re Petition on Campaign and Political Finance, 877 P.2d at 313.
227. In re Proposed Election Reform Amendment, 852 P.2d at 31-32.
228. In re Petition on Campaign and Political Finance, 877 P.2d at 313.
229. In re Proposed Election Reform Amendment, 852 P.2d at 33 n.2.
230. In re Petition on Campaign and Political Finance, 877 P.2d at 313.
231. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 21.
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ment." 2 The purpose of the title requirement is identified in
an early case:
Another object is ... to apprise the people of the subjects of
legislation by the titles of the bills, so that they might have an
opportunity to be heard .... But few are able or care to take
the time necessary to keep informed of all the legislation
proposed at a single session, where it is necessary to examine
in detail every bill in order to obtain this information. When,
however, each proposed act is confined to a single subject, and
that subject is clearly expressed in the title, those interested
are put upon inquiry when legislation is proposed affecting
such subject, without its being necessary for them to examine
every bill for the purpose of seeing that nothing objectionable
is coiled up within the folds of the measure. 3
In applying the language, however, the court has lost sight of
the public notice aspect of the requirement and focused instead
on preventing "surprise and deception to the members of the
General Assembly" itself.234 As a consequence, and in its de-
sire to defer to the General Assembly, the court has discouraged
particularity and detoothed the standard by holding that "[an
appropriate general title which is broad enough to include all
the subordinate matters is considered safer and wiser than an
enumeration of several subordinate matters in the title."235
The "clear expression" requirement now applies to the titles of
initiatives.236 Perhaps this will lead courts to strenghten the
standard.237 In any event, there is ample room for better
judicial protection of the public interest in both the clear
expression rule and the ballot title process.
For an understanding of how an officious citizen can use
the process, consider the recent cases on ballot titles that were
brought by Mr. Douglas Bruce against both the title board and
232. See In re House Bill No. 1353, 738 P.2d 371, 374 n.4 (Colo. 1987) ("The
great majority [of cases under Article V, § 21 of the Colorado Constitution] have
focused principally on the sufficiency of the title to describe the contents of the
bill.").
233. Catron v. Board of Comm'rs, 33 P. 513, 514 (Colo. 1893).
234. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gilpin Inv. Co., 493 P.2d 359, 361 (Colo. 1972);
see also Redmon v. Davis, 174 P.2d 945, 949 (Colo. 1946).
235. Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1363 (Colo. 1988).
236. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
237. The General Assembly declares that it intends the new standard to
"prevent surprise and fraud from being practiced upon voters." COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(II) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
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the proponents of two separate initiatives.238 Mr. Bruce, the
successful sponsor of a 1992 constitutional initiative and
proponent of a 1994 initiative, contested the ballot title of a
measure on school finance. The measure threatened to put on
the ballot language that, if passed, would modify his 1992 tax
amendment. Mr. Bruce also contested the ballot title of an
initiative on campaign and political finance that threatened to
compete with his 1994 initiative proposal. By challenging the
ballot title on school finance, Mr. Bruce was able to reduce
significantly the time its proponents had to gather petition
signatures, with the result that they were not able to gather
enough valid signatures to get their measure on the ballot.
In a third hearing, Mr. Bruce supported the ballot title of
his own initiative.239 The juxtaposition of Mr. Bruce's argu-
ments on the ballot title of his own initiative and his arguments
on the ballot titles of other initiatives demonstrate how a
sophisticated student of the initiative process can abuse the
system. In attacking the school finance initiative, Mr. Bruce
argued that the ballot title, already over two hundred words,
needed more detail2 4° and that the summary should have
included more detail on fiscal impact.24' Included in his
complaint was a request that the title board indicate in the
ballot title that the initiative was "internally conflicting."
242
In his attack on the campaign and political finance initiative
Mr. Bruce also argued for more detail in the ballot title and in
the fiscal impact statement.243 In defense of his own initia-
tive, however, Mr. Bruce argued that the ballot title was too
long.2 44 Moreover, under his 1994 proposed initiative, future
ballot titles would have been limited to seventy-five words, and
238. In re Petition on School Finance, 875 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1994); In re
Petition on Campaign and Political Finance, 877 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1994).
239. In re Proposed Election Reform Amendment, 852 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1993).
240. In re Petition on School Finance, 875 P.2d at 210.
241. Id. at 211.
242. Id. at 212.
243. In re Petition on Campaign and Political Finance, 877 P.2d 311, 314-15
(Colo. 1994).
244. In re Proposed Election Reform Amendment, 852 P.2d 28, 33 (Colo.
1993); see also Jeffrey A. Roberts, Bruce Raps Title Assigned Election Reform Bid,
DENV. POST, Feb. 4, 1993, at B5.
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any requirement of a fiscal statement would have been elimi-
nated.245
Mr. Bruce's activism in contesting ballot titles for the 1994
election must be compared with his success in the ballot title
procedure in 1992. His initiative in 1992, Amendment One on
taxation and revenue limits, passed with what is now regarded
as an incomplete ballot title. The title left out many of the
details in the proposal,246 and may have even contradicted
parts of the text.247
b. The Ballot Information Booklet and
Newspaper Notice
In the 1994 election Colorado voters passed a referendum
that amended the Colorado Constitution to provide for a ballot
information booklet.248 The booklet will be mailed to all regis-
tered voters before any election in which an initiated or referred
measure is on the ballot, at no charge to the proponents. The
booklet will contain the text and ballot title of each measure
and a "fair and impartial analysis" of each measure. 249  The
analysis, to be prepared by a "nonpartisan research staff of the
general assembly," will include a summary of the measure and
a synopsis of the major arguments for and against the measure
and "may include any other information that would assist
understanding the purpose and effect of the measure."211 Any
individual may file comments for consideration by the drafting
245. 1994 Amendment 12, 6(a) (rejected by Colorado voters Nov. 8, 1994)
(on file with Colorado Secretary of State). To add further irony, Mr. Bruce's
successful amendment initiative on taxing and spending powers of the government
requires the government, when submitting revenue and expenditure requests to
the populace, to include something akin to a fiscal impact analysis. COLO. CONST.
art. X, § 20(3)(b)(ii)-(iv) (1992 Amendment One).
246. See supra note 174.
247. Compare Stecher v. Northglenn, No. 93-CV-0263 (D. Ct. Adams County
May 5, 1993) with Cervemy v. Wheatridge, No. 93-CV-0423 (D. Ct. Jefferson
County Mar. 22, 1993) (disagreeing over whether Amendment One stops special
elections on all matters or just revenue questions). Both courts found the ballot
title and the text in conflict.
248. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(7.5) (amended 1994).
249. Id. The booklet also includes the special notice required for all
measures that propose to increase taxes or government borrowing or spending by
article X, section 20(3)(b). Id. § 1(7.5)(c).
250. Id. § 1(7.5)(a). The director of research of the legislative council
prepares the booklet, which is reviewed by the legislative council itself. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 2-3-303(1)(g) (Supp. 1994). The council consists of eighteen
legislators including the leadership. Id. § 2-3-301.
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staff. Interestingly, as yet, there is no procedure in place for
protesting the contents of the booklet in a judicial forum, in
stark contrast to the technical review procedure in the ballot
title process.251
When initiatives relate to issues that are uniquely in the
realm of expertise of public officials, initiatives that alter the
processes of government, for example, the public would
seemingly be interested in the views of some of those officials
on the suggested change. Our distrust of elected officials
prevails, however. Colorado has enacted strict limits on the
role of public officials in the initiative process, regardless of the
issue. The ballot information booklet and other official
summaries are the only fora for comment on initiatives by the
state or any political subdivisions.252 No government unit can
make contributions, in cash or in kind, to either side in an
initiative campaign nor can they expend funds to urge electors
to vote in favor or against a given initiative,253 although a
unit can pass a resolution taking a position on the issue.254
An official may answer unsolicited questions but may spend no
more than fifty dollars of public money on letters and phone
calls incidental to expressing her opinion.255 Public officials
can, however, use private time and money to express their
personal opinions. 2" But they do so at the risk that interest-
ed parties will charge that private time was really public
time.257
The 1994 referendum also amended the constitutional
provisions on newspaper notice. 2 1 Under a decades-old
provision, proposed constitutional amendments had to be
published in two issues of two newspapers of "opposite political
faith" in each county in the state.29  The new requirement
reduces the number of newspaper notices in favor of the ballot
251. This assumes that the summary prepared by the ballot title board is
not the same as the summary prepared under this provision.
252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-116 (Supp. 1994).
253. Can a state university hold a public debate on an initiative, using
university facilities and university personnel?
254. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-116 (Supp. 1994).
255. Id. § 1-45-116(1)(a).
256. Id. § 1-45-116(1)(b)(II).
257. Can a city attorney (or a law professor) leave work and debate a
proponent, during a weekday, at the invitation of a city bar association?
258. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(7.3) (amended 1994).
259. Id. art. XXIII, § 1, amended by COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(7.3).
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information booklet. As a result, several newspapers editorial-
ized against the referendum, often without disclosing their
pecuniary interests, causing the vote to be close.26 ° The new
language requires publication of the text and title of each
initiated and referred measure only once in one newspaper in
each county at least fifteen days before the election.26' Anoth-
er early law, now rescinded, had added a publication require-
ment paid for by the proponents,262 which had the effect of
substantially decreasing the use of initiatives.263
4. Comments on the Colorado Notice Procedures
Voters in Colorado have traditionally had two means of
informing themselves on the text of initiatives, short of request-
ing the text from proponents or traveling to a public library,
and as noted above, voters have just added a third. First, when
voters are approached by petitioners, the petitions contain
ballot titles, summaries, and the full text of the initiatives.
Second, a summary and the full text of each initiative is
published once in every major newspaper. Third, each voter
will, in the future, receive a ballot information booklet on
statewide initiatives. It is easy to minimize the effect of each
of the three sources of information.
Petitions are signed by a small fraction of the electorate.
Even those who sign do not read the summary or text of the
initiative in question. Petitioners report that they can gather
several thousand signatures and have not one signer read the
petition language when she signs. Instead signers choose to
sign or not to sign based entirely on an abbreviated oral
representation made by the solicitor. A solicitor for the failed
260. The main newspaper in the city of Boulder, the Daily Camera, opposed
the referendum and it lost in Boulder County. "No" on Referendums A, B, and C,
DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Oct. 12, 1994, at C2.
261. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(7.3) (amended 1994).
262. For over 30 years, legislation provided for another round of newspaper
publications. A 1941 statute provided that after the ballot title had been fixed, the
Secretary of State was required to publish, once a week for two successive weeks
in each county in a newspaper of general circulation, a copy of the title and text
at the expense of the proponents. Act of Mar. 31, 1941, ch. 147, § 1, 1941 Colo.
Sess. Laws 480, 481. The Colorado Supreme Court held the statute unconstitu-
tional in 1972. See Colorado Project Common Cause v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 218
(Colo. 1972).
263. See Hubert D. Henry, Popular Law-Making In Colorado, 26 RocKY
MTN. L. REv. 439, 449 (1954).
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1994 Amendment Twelve, for example, might have said
exclusively: "Will you sign a petition for limiting politicians'
pay raises?"
Newspaper publication is effective only for those who read
newspapers and even then only for those who look beyond the
sports page and the comics. Those who read or skim the news
usually skip the omnipresent Legal Notice materials, which list
sheriff sales and the like. Even vigilant newspaper readers can
easily miss the one or two days that initiatives appear. More-
over, if our vigilant reader does find the text of initiatives on
the one or two days they are published, she will face the daunt-
ing task of reading small typeface and turgid text, threatening
a significant increase in newspaper reading time. More often
than not, most in this small band of readers (and even smaller
subgroup of voters) will put the section aside for later reading
only to find, thankfully perhaps, that a spouse has thrown the
papers out in the trash.
The ballot information booklet offers the most promise for
voter education, if people separate it from their junk mail and
take the time to read it. The booklet is expensive and will
generate litigation, once rules for appeal are established, as
proponents and opponents with much at stake fight over (and
appeal until exhaustion) whether the content of booklets is "fair
and impartial." Our courts will be very busy around election
time.
Like it or not, most voters in Colorado will take their cue,
first, from thirty second television spots on any initiative and,
second, from the ballot title language, which they will confront
when they get to mark their ballots.
The importance of television spots, and to a lesser extent
radio spots, cannot be overstated.264 Television spots must
necessarily be very conclusory on the effect of an initiative,
there is little or no time to explain detail, and spots often
stretch and bend the truth; advocacy pushes out accuracy. If
one side has more money, as did the opponents of 1994
Amendment One on the tobacco tax (proponents had no money
for television spots at all), it can be a lopsided match in-
264. Newspaper advertisements on initiatives, which allow for more detail
in the argument, are uncommon, perhaps for many of the reasons noted in the text
on the ineffectiveness of required newspaper publication of the text of initiatives.
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deed.265 Money counts in this battle of ads, and, more likely
than not, will determine the winner.266 A fast-forming lucra-
tive business is coalescing around those who service initiative
activists.267 The trustworthiness of those who pay for and
compose the television spots is an issue. It is fair game for
opponents to question each other's sources of funding because
it bears on their credibility. Tobacco companies' ads against the
tobacco tax are self-serving and ought to be discounted. Yet, in
spite of legislation regulating contributions, it is-often difficult
to track down the real source of many contributions.268
The ballot title, a stale, abstracted rendition of the issues
in an initiative, often with little or no indication of the effect of
initiative language on the matters listed, is the only language
on the ballot. For example, a ballot title of "campaign spending
reform" does not specify what the reforms are, and the title
would be the same if the reform is that no corporations can
contribute to campaigns or is a dollar limit on all contributions
from whatever source. Many voters confront initiatives for the
first and only time in this sterile form. As a consequence,
disputes over ballot titles are frequent, with the Colorado
265. The proponents of 1994 Amendment One spent $209,850 and the
opponents spent $6.6 million. See Jerd Smith, Initiative Tabs Top $10 M, DENV.
Bus. J., Nov. 4-10, 1994, at 1A, 47A. 1994 Amendment One was defeated with
62% of the voters opposing it. Aldo Svaldi, Bond Issues Fly, While Taxes Die,
DENV. Bus. J., Nov. 11-17, 1994, at 1A, 37A.
266. In the 1994 election, campaigns backing initiatives were outspent by
forces opposing them by almost six to one. Smith, supra note 265. Of nine
initiatives only one passed, Amendment 17 on term limits, and there was little or
no money spent on either side of the campaign. Id. Seven of the other eight
initiatives passed or failed in correlation with whether the proponents or
opponents spent more. Id. The only exception, Amendment 13 on gaming in
Manitou Springs, had proponents spending $183,664 and opponents spending
$97,468. Id.
267. The business consists of those who provide advertising, political
consultants, lawyers, and campaign managers. In the 1994 Colorado election,
political consultants billed the proponents of Amendment 400 (the arts tax
initiative) almost $100,000 for two months work. Id. Overheads on. campaigns,
for managers and others, is estimated by professionals at 10 to 15% of the total
contributions for the big ticket measures. Id.
268. In Colorado, political committees supporting or opposing initiatives
must file a list of their contributors and individuals spending funds outside the
political committees must file separately. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-104, -108, -110
(Supp. 1994). But the use of layers of front committees or the use of individuals
whose occupations are not specified can make it difficult to track down funding
sources. But see id. § 1-45-106 (1980 & Supp. 1994) (political committees must list
all supporting and affiliated organizations).
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Supreme Court often called on to decide whether the title board
has accurately listed the issues.269
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Our Primary Conclusion: Procedures Not Only
Determine the Mix of Representative and Direct
Democracy, They Also Determine Whether the
Initiative Process Works to Effect Direct Democracy
The populists who gave us initiatives at the turn of the
century had lofty aims: they believed that the initiative process
would best empower citizens, promote good government, perfect
majority rule, and control disobedient and dishonest govern-
ment officials. Inherent in their optimism were beliefs that
representative democracy must be supplemented with a heavy
dose of direct democracy and that the initiative process was an
effective mechanism to achieve direct democracy. Traditional
arguments about the value of the initiative process dwell on the
content of successful controversial proposals.27 ° These debates
miss the important, indeed crucial, role played by procedural
choices. Not all initiative processes are alike, and the differenc-
es affect both of the populist assumptions. We discuss the
effect of procedure on both assumptions below.
First, the procedural details of the initiative process control
the mix of representative and direct democracy. Those who
favor a maximum role for direct democracy argue for no limits
on the content of initiatives, low qualifying thresholds for
accessing the ballot, a simple majority of votes cast for enact-
ment,27' protection from repeal or revision by elected offi-
cials, 272 government subsidies for petitions and publica-
tion,273 and limits on campaign involvement and even com-
269. See supra part IV.E.3.a.
270. See, e.g., Symposium, The Bill of Rights v. The Ballot Box: Constitu-
tional Implications of Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994).
271. That is, they favor enactment by a majority of those who vote, without
a minimum, even for constitutional amendments.
272. This includes protecting a successful initiative from veto by a governor
or from repeal or revision by the legislature. In its extreme form this also includes
limits on referendum or on government officials' own access to the ballot.
273. The government can supply petition forms and pay for the costs of all
public notices. In its extreme form, the government grants subsidies for
campaigns both for and against an initiative, subsidies for private counsel for help
in drafting and processing an initiative through the title board and petition
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ment by public officials.274 Those who believe in a more
limited role for direct democracy argue primarily for limited
ballot access,275 higher voting thresholds,276 the indirect
form of the initiative, and ease of amendment or repeal.7
The impact of the initiative process on a representative system
is controlled by these procedural choices.
The authors' positions on the best mix of representative and
direct democracy are the following. Our primary form of
government is representative. We delegate power to our elected
officials under general guidelines, such as campaign platforms,
and ask them to attend to the details of government. Taking
our cue from shareholder voting power in publicly-held corpora-
tions,278 we believe that initiatives ought to be structured as
validation process, or subsidies for hiring petition circulators.
274. 1994 Amendment 12, which failed with only 23% of the vote in favor,
contained a form of these provisions. Jerd Smith, Deep Pockets Fuel Election
Victories, DENv. Bus. J., Nov. 11-17, 1994, at 1A; 1994 Amendment 12 (rejected
by Colo. voters Nov. 8, 1994) (on file with Colorado Secretary of State).
275. Examples include higher signature requirements for petitions,
prohibition of mail-in signatures, rigorous circulator qualifications, and proponent
payment of the government costs of reviewing and publishing an initiative.
276. An example is to require a supermajority vote for constitutional
amendments. See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy,
66 U. CoLO. L. REV. 143 (1995). Other examples include a minimum vote
requirement, so that a majority vote at a low turnout election cannot effect a
major change.
277. Advocates seek to treat most initiatives as normal laws, with veto
power in the governor and power in the legislature to repeal or amend.
278. The preferred structure of publicly-held firms, honed over time, is a
delegation of management power to experts, with shareholder input reserved for
fundamental changes. Shareholders vote only on the election of the board of
directors and on ratification of major corporate transactions (mergers or
dissolutions, for example). See Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial
Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOwA L. REV. 485, 495-512 (1994).
Limited shareholder access to the firm's proxy machinery is provided in the
Securities and Exchange Commission's controversial Rule 14a-8. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (1994). See generally Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal
Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879 (1994).
Under the current version of the Rule, shareholders may put proposals in the
firm's proxy if they own at least one percent or one thousand dollars in market
value of the securities entitled to vote at the meeting. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(a)(1). The proposal may be omitted if, among other things, it "deals with a
matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations" of the firm or
is not "significantly related" to the firm's business. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(7). A Rule
14a-8 proposal may not be resubmitted unless it receives specified levels of
support. See id. § 240.14-8(c)(12).
The analogy between popular elections and corporate elections is, of course,
imperfect. Disgruntled shareholders can easily sell their shares, while disgruntled
citizens cannot as easily leave their domicile. The difference is reflected perhaps
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a check on this delegation, a safety valve, but not a substitute
or even an equal partner. When discontent with elected
officials reaches high levels of intensity on selected issues, the
initiative process provides a pressure release. The threat of an
initiative, even when unused, has some effect on aligning the
interests of elected officials and their electorate. Those who
believe that policy-setting through the initiative process ought
to dominate or be an equal partner with policy-setting through
representative government run afoul of the process's basic and
unavoidable paradox: The more the populace uses the initiative
process, the less effectively it works.279 Our safety valve view
is reflected in some of our recommendations below.
Second, most of our recommendations are directed at the
populists' second assumption: that initiatives are synonymous
with direct democracy. Regardless of one's view on the proper
mix of representative and direct democracy, the initiative
process as a vehicle for direct democracy is problematic. An
initiative process with an inadequate procedural base does not
serve as a voice for the populace, it serves only the purposes of
those discrete individuals and groups who can best capture the
process. The major abuses that must be addressed through
procedural solutions are drafting deficiencies, petition fraud,
and misleading public communications in campaigns. Whatever
one's view on the positive potential of initiatives, an initiative
process that invites abuse may be inferior to no initiative right
at all. At issue is how to structure the initiative process to
minimize abuse and maximize its value, that is, its accuracy in
reflecting the honest view of a majority of the populace.
We offer our suggestions in three parts. First, we provide
recommendations about how the initiative should be structured
when there is complete freedom of choice, that is, when one is
drafting from scratch constitutional and legislative provisions
on the process. These proposals are relevant for those design-
ing a proposal for a national initiative as well as those suggest-
ing amendments to state constitutions. In our second and third
in the fact that with corporations, even the election itself is generally controlled
by the board of directors through the firm's proxy solicitation machinery, a
situation we would not and do not permit in popular elections. Proxy fights for
control of a board are rare. See Oesterle & Palmiter, supra, at 508.
279. Experience demonstrates that a flood of initiatives inevitably results
in lower vote totals as people tire of the process and abstain. See supra text
accompanying note 45.
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parts, we offer suggestions specific to the current situation in
Colorado, aimed at the state legislature under the assumption
that the constitution stays as is, and at the courts under the as-
sumption that both the constitution and state implementing
legislation stay as they are.
B. Writing on a Clean Slate
1. Use the Indirect Initiative Process
By involving the legslature, yet allowing a vote of the
people, the indirect initiative tends to get some of the best of
both systems. It offers better chances to overcome the drafting
problems of the direct initiative. The legislature can, or must
if a state's constitution requires, give the initiative consider-
ation in hearings and deliberations. This process can point out
unintended consequences to initiators, and can at least make
them aware of the points of most intense disagreement. In
some instances, the problem of oppressing unpopular minorities
can be reduced. Under some systems, the legislature can
propose alternatives that avoid problems with the citizens'
draft.
Opponents of the indirect initiative often complain that it
is simply a delaying device, and that American legislatures in
indirect initiative states seldom do anything during the period
set for legislative review. However, we think the process in
many American states is too hasty anyway, so some delay is
wise even if the indirect form is not used. And legislative
lethargy can be reduced by requiring a minimum degree of
legislative consideration, and by empowering legislatures to
offer alternatives, if that power is lacking.
2. Preserve the Integrity of the American Constitu-
tion: Require Minimum Votes and Word Limits
for Constitutional Amendments
As we have pointed out above, frequent and easy resort to
the initiative device to amend state constitutions has filled
some of these constitutions with measures that are, by the
traditions of American constitutionalism, matters for ordinary
legislation. It also allows sweeping changes to be embedded in
the constitution by the modest plurality that typically adopts
initiated amendments, sometimes at serious cost to constitu-
tional stability.
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These effects are also true in Switzerland, where the device
works well, so they are not necessarily bad. But they seriously
revise the nature of a state's constitution away from the Ameri-
can tradition and in favor of the Swiss. The Swiss constitution
is very different from ours in other ways as well. Judicial re-
view is much more limited, and there is a much weaker sense
of separation of powers. These effects will result from heavy
use of the initiative here. When the state's constitution is
amended, judicial review under the state's constitution is
eliminated, and traditional executive and legislative functions
are constricted. Even initiated statutes avoid the executive
veto.
We think the American system is worth preserving.
Accordingly, in this section we recommend ways to reduce
resorting to the initiative to amend constitutions and to
encourage its use to enact statutes instead. To do this, the
statutory route must be made much more attractive, and the
amending process less so. There is traditionally a higher
number of signatures needed for initiatives that amend
constitutions than for those that enact statutes, although even
that difference has been eliminated in Colorado. In any case,
the petitioning industry can readily meet the constitutional
threshold in most states, so this difference does not have much
significance.
Other proposals offer more promise. In the order of the
intensity of our preference we suggest four approaches. First,
we would require, as is in place in a few states, a minimum
vote to enact a constitutional amendment. The present rule in
most states requires simply a majority of the votes actually
cast, and this is often a rather low percentage of the electorate.
For a relevant example, in the few modern referendums held in
Britain on constitutional matters, there has been a requirement
of approval by at least forty percent of the electorate.2 °
Another version would require a majority of registered
280. See THE REFERENDUM DEVICE 9-10 (Austin Ranney ed., 1981). Even
the most prominent constitutional initiatives in the U.S. fall short of the British
rule. See supra note 18.
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voters. 1 Statutory amendments would continue to require
only a majority of votes cast.
Second, we would limit constitutional amendments rather
strictly to a single subject, but be less strict about the scope of
statutory initiatives. The traditional single-subject rule is
usually not a very strict limit. To make it effective, we
recommend, third, combining it with a rule limiting constitu-
tional initiatives to five hundred words.282 Constitutional
amendments that are longer ought to be promulgated through
constitutional conventions or legislative proposals. We think a
limit on the length of statutory initiatives might be prudent as
well, but the limit could be much higher, say 5000 words.
Fourth, we recommend requiring that the final text of consti-
tutional initiatives be drafted by the state's attorney general,
legislative counsel, or other official, as is now done in New
Zealand. This would of course be subject to an enforceable
requirement that the text accurately carry out the initiators'
purpose. Statutory initiatives would not have this limit.
These measures would induce initiators of measures that
would traditionally be viewed as statutory to go the statutory
route, preserving the state constitution as fundamental law.
Even when initiators would need to amend the constitution,
they would be induced to make a simple, enabling amendment
with a matching statute to carry out their program.
To make the measures fully effective to restore dignity to
state constitutions, it might be necessary to impose some paral-
lel restrictions on the ability of the state legislature to propose
constitutional amendments because low-level provisions are
added to state constitutions that way as well. Moreover, these
measures would be problematic to add to a state constitution
that is already cluttered with many "legislative" provisions,
which would then be made more difficult to amend or repeal
281. Cf MINN. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (referred constitutional amendments
require a majority of total votes cast on any matter in the election); MISS. CONST.
art. 15, § 273(7) (initiated constitutional amendments require 40% of total votes
cast on any matter in the election).
282. The limit is analogous to the limit in the shareholder proposals rule,
SEC Rule 14a-8(b)(1). See supra note 278. The Rule requires all shareholder
proposals and their supporting statements to be under 500 words. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(b)(1) (1994). See also CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 111
(proposing limit of 5000 words for all initiatives).
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than they were to enact. 283 To meet this problem, we propose
that an initiative to repeal a constitutional provision be subject
to less severe restrictions than one proposed to add language.
The scheme we propose makes best sense in the context of a
state constitutional convention or in designing a national right
of initiative.
3. Treat Initiated Laws No Differently Than
Legislatively Passed Statutes
As previously noted, many initiative states restrict the
power of their legislatures to amend initiated statutes.284 In
California, changes can be done only by another initiative or
referendum. This entrenches measures similarly to con-
stitutional amendments. It makes very difficult even technical
amendments to work out defects in legislation. We think these
limits are based on an unrealistic fear of legislatures.285
Legislatures are in fact very cautious about trying to change
anything in initiatives because of popular criticism that is
aroused. However, this fear is real and needs to be accommo-
dated.
We suggest that legislatures be empowered to amend
initiated statutes subject to two protections. First, such
changes must not be combined with any other legislation; there
should be a strict single-subject rule. Second, the procedures
for a referendum to rescind this particular kind of legislation
should be easier to meet than for rescinding referendums
generally. The Swiss experience shows that the rescinding
referendum can be a powerful check on the legislature.286
283. For a failed attempt to clean up a badly cluttered state constitution, see
Arrow, supra note 47.
284. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
285. There is no evidence that legislatures in states that allow unrestricted
amendment or repeal abuse the power. Similar arguments can be made for giving
a governor veto power. It will rarely be exercised, and when exercised, a governor
will do so only when her extraordinary concern about the effect of a measure on
the welfare of the state outweighs the risk to her political future. This is a fire
alarm we may want to respect, especially since most initiatives are passed by a
favorable vote of less that 33% of the total number of registered electors in the
state. The major difference between an initiative and a legislative bill is, of
course, there is no process for overriding a veto of an initiative. A partial solution
could allow a governor to veto only initiatives that pass by less than a 67%
majority vote (or, in the alternative, a favorable vote of less than 50% of the total
number of registered voters).
286. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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This kind of check would tend to induce advance negotiations
between proponents of the measure to be amended and the
legislature, which would work out many problems.
4. Enforce a Single-Subject Rule
Many difficulties with present practices for initiatives arise
out of issues about their scope. If an initiative covers unrelated
subjects, voters must decide whether to swallow the bitter to
get the sweet. In general, the longer an initiative, the less well
voters understand it. Its title and summary become less
accurate. Its problems of drafting, unintended consequences,
hidden issues, and the like become more serious. In our
discussion of constitutionalism and amending statutes above,
we have made several proposals to address problems of scope.
Here we add a few more that do not directly connect with those
subjects.
A single-issue rule, interpreted sensibly, is a useful limit on
the scope of initiatives, both constitutional and statutory.
Proponents of the initiative complain that such limits unduly
restrict the initiative or make it too expensive to circulate mul-
tiple petitions. To meet this objection, we propose allowing
initiatives that cover more than one subject to be joined in a
common petition, but to require separate votes by the elector-
ate. In this way, voters, like state legislators, can vote sepa-
rately on discrete measures. But petition circulators can
circulate multiple measures on a common petition.
In our discussion above on constitutionalism, we have pro-
posed limits on the number of words in an initiated measure, a
strict limit for constitutional amendments, and a more generous
limit for statutes. These limits can also be worked into a mul-
tiple petition process.
As discussed below, some state courts have imposed a limit
on the scope of initiatives by ruling that the scope of some
initiatives is so broad that they "revise" rather than "amend"
the state's constitution. This rule depends on language in the
state constitution that contrasts revising, which requires a
constitutional convention, with amending, that can be done by
initiative.2 7
287. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text; infra notes 321-24 and
accompanying text.
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5. Provide a Qualifying Period Long Enough to
Allow Discussion, Deliberation, and Amendment
of Proposed Initiatives
As previously noted, qualifying periods vary from ninety
days to an unlimited period of time.288 We think mandated
short periods, such as Colorado's six month limit, are too hasty,
especially for constitutional initiatives. Even if the indirect
initiative is not adopted, some of its virtues can be achieved by
extending the period for qualification. Based on the Swiss
experience, one to two years seems optimal.
To make the extended period useful, there must also be
reasonable procedures for review of drafts, public notice and
hearing, consultation among proponents, officials, and oppo-
nents, and opportunities to amend proposals or to withdraw
them in favor of legislative substitutes that are satisfactory to
proponents. Legislatures should be empowered to refer
competing measures, as in Switzerland. There should be clear
rules about who can speak for proponents to amend or with-
draw proposals.28 9
Mandatory public review and comment on draft initiatives
can be valuable if there is time enough for discussion, negotia-
tion, and involvement of opponents. However, if officials must
give serious and substantive review to every draft proposal, no
matter how frivolous, the cost of review will cause the review
of each proposal to be inadequate. Therefore we propose a
substantial filing fee for initiative proposals, on the order of one
thousand dollars for statewide proposals, to deter the frivo-
lous29 ° and to defray some of the cost of review and comment.
This recommendation may strike some advocates of direct
democracy as unfair to poor proponents, but that is a short-
sighted view. It takes a lot of money, much more than one
288. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
289. Also, when initiators qualify an initiative too late to make the ballot
in the year of submission, the measure should go on the next year's ballot, unless
withdrawn in favor of a compromise with the legislature. This will reduce the
intense pressures that surround the qualifying process in many states.
290. In the September 1994 conference, a Colorado state official related the
case of parents who submitted an initiative proposal with their child as a civics
lesson. Catharyn Baird, Tape of Conference on Governing by Initiative, supra note
125. However educational this was for the family, mandatory review by the state
was expensive. Id.; see also CALIFORNIA COMMN, supra note 9, at 137 (similar
problems in other states).
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thousand dollars, to qualify a statewide initiative. And it takes
broad and organized support to get a favorable vote. Thus to
qualify and then to win the election requires organized backing
of sufficient extent that a one thousand dollar filing fee is not
a significant barrier. And the need to improve drafting of ballot
measures, particularly those that amend state constitutions, is
very great.
An alternative to the filing fee is a two-step initiative
process. Initiators gather a certain number of signatures to
show significant backing for their proposal. At that point,
public review, hearing, and comments are required, and the
proposal can be amended or withdrawn in favor of a legislative
alternative. However, the cost to proponents of this procedure
probably exceeds a one thousand dollar filing fee, so we think
the fee the more reasonable procedure. Of course, proponents
might be given a choice of either method.
C. The Role of Implementing Legislation in Colorado
The Colorado Constitution empowers the General Assembly
to pass implementing legislation on initiatives.29' Another
relevant provision states, "The general assembly shall pass laws
to secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of
the elective franchise." "' The lead role in protecting the
populace against abuses of the initiative power then rests with
the legislature.29 Many of the recommendations made above
are clearly beyond the power of the legislature (the minimum
vote requirements for constitutional amendments, for example)
and some are arguably beyond the power (the word limit, for
example). In any event, the legislature can work within the
structure of its existing legislation to effect some positive
changes.
291. See supra note 97.
292. COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
293. It is interesting to speculate whether the courts would have some role
if the legislature, breaching its obligations, refused to pass any legislation. At
issue would be whether such a case was justiciable. Cf Pacific States Tel. & Tel.
v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (challenge to initiative under "republican
guarantee" clause held not justiciable).
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1. Extend the Qualifying Periods, and Establish
Fair and Effective Procedures for Ballot Title
Protests, Single-Subject Review, and Negotiations
About Draft Initiatives
The Colorado Constitution requires review of every draft
initiative within two weeks after its submission.294 The de-
fects in this procedure have been pointed out, and the state
constitution would have to be amended to cure most of them.
One remedy open to the legislature is to direct that review be
broader than the narrow, technical review now undertaken. It
would be useful for reviewers to do more to carry out their
existing duty to suggest "editorial changes to promote compli-
ance with the plain language provisions" of the statute,295
particularly for initiatives that would amend the state constitu-
tion.2 96 However, the short time span and requirement to
review every proposal, including the trivial, limit the review
procedure in any case.
Other preliminary procedures are controlled by statutes,
which the General Assembly can amend. First, procedures
governing the new single-subject requirement297 should be
clarified. Administrative review is sensibly done simultaneous-
ly with the fixing of the ballot title, but it should be clear that
294. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5).
295. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-105(1) (Supp. 1994). See supra notes 159-64
and accompanying text.
296. It would be more useful still to impose enforceable requirements of
simplicity and clarity, but this would probably require a constitutional amend-
ment. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5). There is historical precedent for judicial
intervention to enforce standards of minimal drafting clarity. The first statute
implementing the Colorado initiative allowed proponents to write the ballot title.
Act of May 8, 1913, ch. 97, § 4, 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 310, 312, repealed by Act of
Mar. 31, 1919, ch. 131, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 431. The ballot title had to be "brief
and not conflict with that selected in any petition previously filed." Id. If the
ballot title was "misleading or unreasonably long," private parties could ask the
state courts to enjoin its use. Id. If enjoined, "a majority of persons representing
signers shall select another ballot-title that shall fairly describe the measure
submitted to vote." Id.
Judicial enforcement of clarity is now done by the Supreme Court of Florida.
See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So.2d 486 (Fla.
1994).
297. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5) (amended 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-
106.5 (Supp. 1994). See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
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rehearing and judicial review of both can be done together in a
single proceeding open to opponents as well as proponents.29 s
Second, there should be adequate notice of the pendency of
titling and single-subject review both to the legislature and to
the public, and review of these decisions should be fairly
available to opponents who are new to the process.
Third, the General Assembly should establish a regular
procedure to review pending measures to identify those likely
to be important to its members. These in turn should be
considered for committee hearing and in appropriate cases for
discussion and negotiation with proponents. In general, the
General Assembly should be more actively involved in the
initiative process, while initiative proponents retain the right
to force a vote on their own proposal.
Fourth, the authority of proponents to negotiate compromis-
es with the legislature should be made clear. The definition of
who are proponents should be made certain, and it should be
clear that they can act to amend or withdraw their proposal by
majority vote.299
Fifth, to facilitate other measures, the periods for qualifying
an initiative should be lengthened. Present periods for review
of drafts (two weeks) and title-setting (about the same) are too
short. The maximum period for the entire process (about eleven
months) should be longer, especially for constitutional initia-
tives. These changes are needed to allow more time for
legislative review and possible negotiation with proponents.
They would also give more time for other interested persons to
participate in the qualifying process, yet give proponents ample
time to gather signatures. The opportunity under present
procedures for opponents to tie up an initiative proposal in
court so that proponents do not have enough time to gather
signatures3 °° should be eliminated.
2. Put the Full Text of Initiatives on the Ballot
With the single-subject rule in place, initiatives will be
shorter. With shorter initiatives comes an opportunity to take
some of the importance away from the currently momentous
298. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
299. Swiss practices provide a model. See supra note 156.
300. See supra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
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and decisive ballot title procedure.3"' The government can
put the full language of any initiative on the ballot. °2 Propo-
nents, recognizing the problem of asking for voters to pass a
long measure, would be further pressured to keep their
measures brief.3" 3 The change would give voters the best
chance of not being misled by a conclusory or incomplete ballot
title,30 4 avoid some of the contentious and expensive proce-
dures currently employed,305 and eliminate the disadvantage
suffered by targeted groups who wake up late to the importance
of the ballot title process and are, therefore, excluded.30 6
D. The Role of the Colorado Courts in Policing Initiative
Procedures
Assuming that neither the Colorado Constitution nor
Colorado statutes are revised, the last line of defense against
initiative abuse is in state courts. As noted above, state courts
play two roles in the initiative process; they review administra-
tive determinations and they rule on claims of unconstitutional-
ity. Of the total time the Colorado courts spend on cases
involving initiatives, most is spent on tasks enumerated in the
implementing legislation. The Colorado Supreme Court has
direct review of ballot title board decisions. 30 ' And District
Courts hear protests of the Secretary of State's findings on the
sufficiency of petition signatures. °8
Cases on claims of unconstitutionality come infrequently
and are of two types: first, frustrated proponents attack state
implementing legislation on the initiative process as inconsis-
301. See supra part IV.E.3.a.
302. In Colorado, the full text of an initiative has never appeared on the
ballot.
303. The legislation putting the full text on the ballot could apply only to
initiatives for constitutional amendments, giving proponents two incentives: First,
to consider a non-constitutional initiative, and second, to keep constitutional
amendments brief.
304. For an extreme example, consider what many people would infer from
a ballot title on "Election Reform" or "Taxation and Spending Limits" if they have
not read the specific language (or an adequate summary) of an initiative.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16.
307. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
308. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-118 (Supp. 1994). The protesting party has
the burden of proof. Id. § 1-40-119 (Supp. 1994). The district court is to hold
hearings "as soon as is conveniently possible" and conclude hearings within thirty
days. Id. Appeals go directly to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id.
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tent with the state constitution; °9 and, second, unsuccessful
opponents of a successful initiative attack the content of the
initiative as a violation of the federal Constitution.310 Claim-
ants have been successful in each genre.3 What is missing
309. See supra note 102. Proponents have also successfully attacked state
legislation under the First Amendment. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,428 (1988);
see infra note 311.
310. See supra notes 13, 52.
311. See supra notes 52, 102. The courts have on occasion frustrated the
efforts of the state legislature to impose sensible controls on the initiative proce-
dure. In Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), for example, the Court held that the
Colorado prohibition against paying circulators of initiative petitions violated the
First Amendment. The prohibition was aimed at reducing incentives for petition
fraud. And, to no one's surprise, the aftermath of the opinion has been increased
petition fraud in signature gathering. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
The Supreme Court held, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that because
the prohibition involved a limitation on political expression it was subject to
"exacting scrutiny." Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. at 420. But the concern rejected by
the Court in Buckley, the domination of the political process through expenditures
on media advertising, is distinguishable from rules aimed at curbing fraud. The
Meyer Court found that the prohibition limits the "number of voices" of those who
will convey the message of the initiative proponents to garner the necessary
signatures. Id. at 422-23. The Court held that the burdens on speech were not
justified by the state's interest in curbing petition fraud because after-the-fact
prosecutions of those who do forge a signature "seem adequate to the task of
minimizing the risk of improper conduct in the circulation of a petition." Id. at
427. The Colorado state legislature disagreed, of course, and new evidence would
appear to support their view over the Court's speculation to the contrary. It is
troubling to consider where the Court's reasoning can go. Is it unconstitutional
to prohibit, as Colorado does, mail solicitations of signatures? The prohibition on
mail solicitations imposes the same burdens (it is more difficult to gather
signatures) which concerned the Court in Meyer v. Grant, and the same
alternative (after the fact prosecutions for petition fraud) is available. One could
make similar arguments against any procedural rule that imposes burdens on
proponents (the affidavit requirement for circulators or the Secretary of State's
refusal to accept disassembled petition sections, for example). In short, the case
may require courts to evaluate, under the strict scrutiny test of the First
Amendment, all of the intricate procedural details of the initiative procedure. The
Courts ought not assume this administrative role, whatever the constitutional
doctrine ostensibly involved.
For an example of further judicial meddling with initiative procedures, see
American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, No. 93-M-1467, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17134 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-1576 (10th Cir. Dec.
16, 1994). The plaintiffs sought to invalidate seven technical aspects of the
Colorado procedure, the identification and reporting of paid circulators, the
requirement that circulators be 18 and a registered elector, the reporting of
contributions, the six month circulation period, and the circulator affidavit
requirement. Id. at *2-3. The court held that the Colorado requirement that paid
circulators wear badges identifying themselves as "paid" is unconstitutional. Id.
at *20. It also invalidated the state's requirement that the proponents of a
petition must disclose the names, addresses, and county of voter registration of all
paid circulators, and the state's requirement that proponents report the amount
1995]
118 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
in the case law is a third type of claim, a hybrid of the claims
courts now entertain, a claim based on constitutionality under
the state constitution of the form and content of individual
initiatives. The Colorado courts have not recognized any way
to enforce the minimum affirmative demands of the constitu-
tional reservation of initiative power on the content of the
initiatives themselves. This omission is unfortunate. The
language and history of the 1910 amendment to the Colorado
Constitution establishing the initiative right support a judicial
role in the development of minimal standards of scope and clari-
ty.
312
In response, perhaps, to this lacuna in the case law, the
General Assembly referred the single-subject amendment to the
electorate in 1994. The amendment, although attracting biting
comment by well known initiative activists,313 passed by more
than a two-thirds margin. Courts will be asked to enforce the
single-subject rule. Had the courts explored the necessary
implications of existing language in the constitution, the single-
subject rule may not have been necessary.314 In the discus-
sion below, we consider both the general constitutional lan-
guage on initiatives and the enforcement of the new single-
subject rule.
1. Necessary Implications of the Initiative Grant
Article V of the Colorado Constitution reserves for the
people of Colorado the initiative power.3"5 The courts quite
correctly protect the people's right from the state legislature by
invalidating implementing legislation which frustrates the
paid to circulators. Id. at *24-25.
312. See supra notes 76-77, 296 and accompanying text. In this regard, the
Colorado Supreme Court has often taken the general position that the initiative
provisions of the Colorado Constitution should be liberally construed to effectuate
their purpose and facilitate the exercise by electors of this most important right
reserved to them by the Constitution. E.g., Colorado Project Common Cause v.
Anderson, 495 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1972).
313. An active initiative proponent referred to it as "the most evil
proposition... on any ballot, anywhere, at any time." Steve Lipsher, Two Days
and Counting; Measure Would Cut "Log Rolling," DENY. POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at C1
(quoting Douglas Bruce).
314. For a general discussion of implied or implicit powers of adjudication,
see generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
315. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(1)-(2).
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initiative process,316 but they have not protected the people's
right from opportunistic proponents of initiatives. An opportu-
nistic proponent attempts not to convince a majority of the
people of the correctness of a proposal, but to put language in
the constitution, via clever issue matching or confusion and
deception, which does not have the support of a majority of the
electorate.
In most cases, the people can protect themselves from
opportunistic initiative proponents by voting "no." Someone or
some group will publicly oppose almost any given initiative,
fund an attack, and push the proponents to justify publicly the
details of their proposal. Even absent a well-funded public
debate in the media, many conscientious voters will inform
themselves and others in discharge of their civic responsibility.
The ballot box may be protection enough if proponents are too
obvious in their manipulations. Occasions arise, however, when
voters are overmatched by an opportunistic strategy used by a
clever proponent. In such cases, the courts may need to step in
and enforce minimal standards of content aimed at preventing
the more egregious cases of proponent misbehavior.
a. The People's Initiative Right is Frustrated by
Multi-Issue Initiatives
The problems created by multi-issue initiatives are dis-
cussed extensively above.317 A multi-issue initiative can frus-
trate the ability of the people to voice their true views on each
issue, with the result that such initiatives empower only propo-
nents, whose strategic behavior puts voters in an unacceptable
bind.
b. The People's Initiative Right Is Frustrated by
Initiatives That Are Devious, Vague and
Opaque, or Inaccessibly Complex
Initiatives that cannot be understood by reasonably
informed Colorado voters ought also to fail constitutional
muster. It is hard to see how putting language to the populace
316. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. The courts take great
pains to construe the legislation "liberally" to facilitate the process. E.g., Montero
v. Meyer, 795 P.2d 242, 245 (Colo. 1990) (three month filing requirement does not
apply to "refiled" petitions).
317. See supra part IV.D.
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that is devious, opaque or inaccessibly complex is consistent
with the people's exercise of their constitutional power. Clever
proponents, whose strategy is either to mislead voters into
voting affirmatively or to confuse enough voters into abstaining
so that an intense group of supporters can carry the vote, ought
to be interdicted. Successful deception or confusion by initiative
proponents is not, in any meaningful way, consistent with the
people's constitutional right to propose and vote on initiatives.
Of course, the standards for rejecting a devious, opaque or
inaccessibly complex initiative as unconstitutional ought to be
rigorous and difficult, with only those initiatives that easily and
obviously fail the test being rejected. The test ought not to be
that an initiative is not understood by the Colorado voters,
although this is positive evidence of a problem, but that an
initiative cannot be understood by even conscientious and
reasonably informed citizens.318 And rejection should allow
reasonable opportunity for proponents to cure their draft.
c. Is Judicial Inaction Justified?
Those who do not want the state courts more involved in
the initiative process can make several arguments. First, one
can argue that the people can protect themselves from even
extreme forms of opportunistic behavior by using the initiative
power to repeal unwanted constitutional language. History has
shown, however, that it is very difficult to repeal a successful
initiative. In Colorado, for example, the only repealed initia-
tives were those caught in a general referendum stripping the
constitution of outdated language. One of the expunged
provisions was a prohibition on funding for the 1976 Olympics,
put in by initiative. There is typically no discrete organized
constituency interested in gathering petitions to repeal a
successful initiative, and the General Assembly, wary of "insult-
ing voters," will not use its referendum authority to ask voters
to reconsider or even redraft a successful initiative.3 19
318. See supra part IV.C.1. There was widespread agreement after
Amendment One passed in 1992 that no one had even a general sense of its
practical effect beyond its basic requirement of a vote on new or increased taxes.
See Shaw, supra note 175, at 2 (State House Majority Leader: "You have to read
the Amendment two times a day to try and understand it.").
319. One of the authors, convinced that voters wanted a tax limit in 1992
but not a ratchet down effect given them by Amendment One, see supra note 175,
offered, through a state senator, referendum language that would clean up
STRUCTURING BALLOT INITIATIVES
Second, one can argue that "the people will get what they
deserve" if they do not protect themselves at the polls. This is
a harsh evaluation of the deserts of a basically trusting popu-
lace. Should we learn distrust? Will the costs of a painful post-
election surprise on the effect of a successful initiative encour-
age more informed voting in the future? As noted above, the
evidence is to the contrary; voters tend to weary of initiatives
and abstain.
Third, one can argue that judges have too little political
capital to get in the business of overturning initiatives that
have passed with a majority vote. As we have recently seen
with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision on Amendment
Two,32° a decision throwing out a successful initiative is
unusually controversial, with passionate critics attacking the
court's legitimacy as well as its judgment. The state court's role
on Amendment Two generated support for an initiative on
recalling state judges. This message is of course not lost on our
judges, and gives them the proper incentive, that is, to overrule
the electorate in only the most egregious cases. Moreover, a
procedure empowering judges to review clarity before a vote is
taken would alleviate much of the problem.
2. Comparing "Amendments" to "Revisions and
Alterations": Initiatives Cannot Fundamentally
Alter the Existing Constitutional Structure
The scope of initiatives can also be limited by how funda-
mental is the change to the existing structure of Colorado
government. In the Colorado Constitution, the people may
propose "amendments" to the constitution by initiative (and the
legislature may propose "amendments") but the people can
"revise, alter and amend" the constitution only through a
constitutional convention. This difference in language has a
purpose. Some changes are so fundamental that they must be
Amendment One and preserve its basic effect. S. Con. Res. 7, 59th Colo. Gen.
Assembly, 1st Sess. (1993). The resolution lost twice in the Senate State Affairs
Committee with a majority of senators taking the position that the General
Assembly would "insult" voters if they even implied that the voters did not
understand the full impact of all of the language in the successful initiative.
320. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1994)
(No. 94-1039).
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accomplished through a constitutional convention.321  The
California Supreme Court, on similar constitutional language,
has recognized the distinction. 22 At issue is whether any
initiative effects such a deep fundamental change.
There are two kinds of initiatives that fail this test. First,
some individual constitutional changes ought not be done by
initiative. They change provisions that are too basic and have
too long a history. Examples include initiatives that eliminate
one of the three branches of state government (elimination of
the Governor's Office, for example) or effect a fundamental
rebalance of power among the branches (vesting taxing power
solely in the Governor's Office, for example) or eliminate an
essential aspect of sovereignty (such as the power of eminent
domain).323 Second, some initiatives which, through their
multi-issue content, contain wholesale tinkering with numerous
parts of the constitutional language, are too invasive. Any one
provision in the initiative may not effect a fundamental change,
but when all the provisions are added up, the change is too
sweeping to be done by a single initiative amendment.324
3. The Due Process Clause and Initiative
Procedures
As discussed above, the implementing legislation of the
initiative process can and has been ruled inconsistent with the
constitutional language in the Colorado Constitution that
created the initiative process. The Due Process Clause of the
federal Constitution and the due process clause of the Colorado
Constitution also support challenges to deficient initiative
procedures in implementing legislation. If the initiative
procedures are inaccessible to all but a few, because, for
example, of very short review and appeal deadlines or because
of nonpublic hearings before hidden tribunals, the due process
321. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2); Id. art. XIX, §§ 1, 2.
322. Courts in several states have held that, although the state constitution
reserves to the electorate the power to "amend" by initiative, the people may
.revise" the constitution only through constitutional conventions. See supra notes
181-83 and accompanying text.
323. But see Legislature of the State of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991)
(ballot measure limiting California legislature's terms and budget not a "revision");
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1284-89 (Cal. 1978) (Proposition 13, a taxation reform measure, was not a
"revision").
324. E.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
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clauses ought to come into play. The courts have rejected all
such challenges to date.
In Montero v. Meyer,325 for example, the Tenth Circuit
heard a challenge by Spanish-speaking citizens against an
initiative that designated English as Colorado's official lan-
guage. The plaintiffs argued that their due process rights were
violated because they had inadequate notice of the title board
hearing and of their right to appeal the title board findings.
The Tenth Circuit's holding, reversing the district court,326
was unfortunate. The Tenth Circuit held, first, that the title
board was "ministerial," not judicial, and that the notice
standards of judicial proceedings were inapplicable.327 Sec-
ond, it held that the plaintiffs had no "constitutionally protected
liberty interest" because "the Colorado Constitution creates no
legitimate entitlement in the plaintiffs to participate in the
process of placing an amendment on the ballot."328 Further-
more, the implementing legislation creates "no special rights."
Any rights created by the Colorado statutes in qualified
electors are rights in a narrowly-circumscribed procedural
review of the actions of the title board in carrying out its
responsibility to make sure that the title, submission clause
and summary are fairly worded and reflect the intent of the
proponents .... [A] liberty interest created by state law is by
definition circumscribed by the law creating it....
... Plaintiffs missed their statutory procedural opportu-
nity for review that they share with all qualified electors.
They have no further rights.329
The court's holding overlooked the essence of the plaintiff's
claim that given the brief, hidden nature of the ballot title
review process, whatever rights they had could not be exercised.
They were not arguing for special notice but that the process in
325. 13 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994).
326. The District Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,
ordering that the title board comply with specified notice and publication
requirements. The court refused to order retroactive relief, however, and would
not invalidate the successful initiative. Id. at 1446.
327. Id. at 1446 n.2.
328. Id. at 1448.
329. Id. at 1449-50.
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place did not give interested parties a sufficient opportunity to
appeal the title board's determination."3 °
The Tenth Circuit supported both arguments using a
flawed vision of the title board process.
Plaintiffs' alleged expectation in this case would inject into the
initiative process a debate on the merits (or at least the
phrasing of a ballot measure) that would diminish, at the
critical point of framing the issue to reflect the intent of the
proponents, the constitutional grant of the clear right of the
people of Colorado to propose laws and amendments and have
them presented to the electorate. 3'
No one disputes that the opponents of an initiative, if fortunate
enough to know of the details of the title board procedure, have
standing to contest the accuracy of the ballot title. So the
"debate" feared by the Tenth Circuit is already an established
procedure, as it should be. Opponents as well as proponents
have an interest in the accuracy of the ballot title. Indeed,
opponents are a check on the desire of some proponents to put
inaccurate or misleading but saleable ballot title language on
the ballot. The argument, misunderstood by the Tenth Circuit,
is that a professional initiative proponent and opponent can use
the procedure to contest ballot title board holdings, while other
groups such as the Spanish-speaking population of Colorado,
not normally engaged in the process but finding something dear
to them on the table, find themselves closed out of the process.
4. Enforcing the Single-Subject Requirement
What level of commonality among issues will satisfy Col-
orado's new single-subject requirement? Courts often recite
vague, general standards of germaneness or relevance among
issues.332 Such concepts make sense only with an eye to the
intended purposes of the rule. For Colorado, these are well set
330. There is no publication requirement in Colorado until after the time
has expired for a protest of the title by a registered elector before the Secretary of
State. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-107, -124 (Supp. 1994).
331. Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d at 1450.
332. E.g., Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47, 50 (1949) ("all parts . . . are
reasonably germane"). Colorado's recent cases on bills state the standard as
"necessarily or properly connected to each other rather than disconnected or incon-
gruous." In re House Bill 1353, 738 P.2d 371, 374 (Colo. 1987). On problems of
defining a suitable test, see CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at 312-20; Daniel
Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV.
936 (1983).
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out in supporting legislation and in judicial opinions interpret-
ing the state's longstanding single-subject rule applicable to leg-
islative bills.333 The rule serves to avoid the logrolling mis-
chiefs of bundling bills with partial support so that the sum has
greater backing than any of its parts, and of using a popular
lead provision to bring along others that could not pass alone.
It improves voter information and understanding of the subjects
of their vote, and it empowers voters to make more choices.
When a reasonable voter would want the chance to vote on
parts of a measure separately, the rule should guarantee that
right.
Two recent examples illustrate possible applications of the
rule. The constitutional amendment passed as Amendment
One in 1992, when no single-subject rule applied, contains at
least five subjects: limits on tax increases, limits on spending
increases, limits on debt increases, general election procedures,
and relations between state and local governments. 334 Both
public polls and voter behavior since 1992 suggest that voters
would have voted no on parts of the measure if given the
choice. 335 A second example is Amendment 13 on the 1994
ballot, which failed to pass.336 It combined authorizations for
gambling in the town of Manitou Springs, and in airports.
Colorado's rule is applied in the first instance by the title-
setting board.337 Its decision should be subject to prompt ju-
dicial review, which takes place not only before enactment by
voters but before petitions are circulated. At that stage, pro-
ponents' investment in their draft is minimal and corrections
can readily be made.
Single-subject challenges to ballot measures can also be
made after enactment. Review at that stage differs in impor-
tant respects. Proponents have already incurred the expense of
circulating petitions and of an elective campaign, and the
measure can no longer be redrafted. For these and other
reasons, the courts apply a strong presumption of validity,
333. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 166-69, 174 and accompanying text. It also forbids
some taxes outright and creates an incentive to sell public land. The latter could
be considered a sixth subject.
335. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
336. Id.
337. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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which does not apply before enactment.33 On the other hand,
in post-enactment review a Colorado court can find the measure
severable and sustain its principal parts.3 39  But that is a
crude remedy. It is clearly better to have single-subject review
completed before petitions are circulated. Without legislation,
courts cannot do that directly, but they can apply different
standards of review at the two stages. Review of title-setting
should faithfully carry out the purposes of the single-subject
rule, to combat logrolling and increase voter understanding and
choice. On the other hand, review after enactment should apply
the traditional presumption of constitutionality.
On the single-subject rule, procedures are again of crucial
importance. Colorado's procedures differ significantly from
those in California, which have been largely ineffective.
340 If
the Colorado title board and courts carry out the duties that the
single-subject provisions appear to impose on them, the
Colorado rule should be a useful corrective to abuse of the
initiative.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like any avenue to power, the initiative has attracted
abusers. However, most critics of the device miss the mark by
focusing entirely on the substantive results of the initiative
votes. Abuses of the initiative are largely caused by structural
and procedural flaws. If they are corrected, the initiative can
work as an important check on representative and administra-
tive government.
338. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
339. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5) (amended 1994). See also id., art. V § 21.
340. In California, judicial review under the single-subject rule rarely occurs
before enactment, and this substantially weakens the rule. See Steven W. Ray,
Note, The California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule, 14
PAC. L.J. 1095, 1105-07 (1983). See also CALIFORNIA COMM'N, supra note 9, at
312-20. Moreover, California courts must either sustain or strike down an
initiated law in its entirety; there is no authority to sever and save parts. See
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) ("An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not ... have any effect.").
Florida requires judicial review on single subject after 10% of needed
signatures have been gathered, and the state courts apply a strict standard. If a
measure contains more than one subject, proponents may then amend, and the
state allows four years to qualify for the ballot. See Advisory Opinion to the
Attorney General re Tax Limitation, 644 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1994); CALIFORNIA
COMM'N, supra note 9, at 108-09.
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How the initiative right is structured also affects the
essential nature of a state's constitution. Where initiatives to
amend state constitutions are easily available, constitutions are
changed frequently and by modest pluralities of state voters.
Provisions that seem legislative in character are added and
placed beyond the reach of judicial review under the state
constitution. We recommend designing the initiative right to
enact a statute to be much more accessible than the right to
amend the state constitution. We also address other procedural
shortcomings of the initiative process, particularly in Colorado.
The details of our recommendations aside, the most
important insight of our research is that questions of structure
and procedure should be an essential part of America's debate
on the merits of state ballot initiatives and proposals for a
national initiative.

